On the other side of the pond, however, where there are actual socialists, public discussion of the crisis has been a little different. Politicians on the left and on the right have been quick to blame the financial crisis on laissez-faire economic policies, and leaders on both sides of the aisle have spoken out in favor of greater regulation of financial markets. No doubt, this is partly instinctive. The European approach always tends to be more technocratic and dirigiste. Here, the public ritual, in times of economic uncertainty, is to emphasize the more protective spirit of the European social model. This is particularly true of right wing French presidents. After the French famously rejected the European constitution in 2005, then-president Jacques Chirac started cheerleading the French and European social models like a roadside convert. And President Nicolas Sarkozy, who’s right at home on the deck of many a billionaire’s yacht, recently felt the need to disrespect the Davos.

European leaders have not shied away from directly criticizing the market’s behavior, when they don’t like it. This has been especially true while the Greek fiscal crisis has wound on. There’s been a lot of talk, for instance, of a “speculative attack” on Greece, and thinly veiled warnings directed at market participants. After the Eurozone Finance Ministers’ meeting last Friday, French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde  went so far as to warn off speculators. They “had better be careful,” she said, “There is clearly a statement of solidarity—we are closing ranks. Whether we are big member states or small member states we are all in this together and we are not going to let any of us down.” She even followed this with an implicit regulatory threat.  “What we are going to take away from this crisis,” she added, “is certainly a second look at the validity, the solidity of [Credit default swaps] on sovereign debt.”

Christine Lagarde. Photo by MEDEF

It’s a little hard to imagine Tim Geithner, or any American politician of sound mind, threatening hedge funds with regulation if they didn’t stop shorting the stock market. (Actually, he’d probably just ban the practice.)  But the swift drop in the Euro last week struck a nerve. It’s just too reminiscent of the speculative attacks (by George Soros, et.al.) that surrounded the establishment of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the system that preceded the Euro, in the early nineties. Last week, the short position against the European common currency hit a record high. Still, to call it a “speculative attack” is to take a point of view on the appropriate level of the Euro. Also, it assumes a concerted effort.

Unlike in the Anglophone world, where markets are spoken of like acts of nature, in Europe, it raises few eyebrows when politicians or commentators ascribe motives to the financial market.  Here’s how Jean-Marc Sylvestre, chef economics editor for French TV channel TF1, recently described the speculative attacks on Greece:

The architects are investment funds, in particular hedge funds, with considerable liquidity, whose job it is to put that money to work for maximum profit… these investment funds choose an investment target they feel is fragile and swoop down on it very quickly… on the recommendation of their financial analysts, who returned from Davos brimming with confidence, many hedge funds began to sell Greek debt heavily, and then the Euro, hoping to redeem the paper in two or three weeks when it was worthless.

Note the predatory metaphor, the emphasis on their greed, and their analysts’ pride— “swooping down quickly for maximum profit”, as opposed to, one imagines, less rapacious investors, who invest at a leisurely pace and for middling profits. The point is, there’s a strong mainstream European tradition of belief that markets are controlled by cabals, at least some of the time. It’s a point of view that could get you banned from CNBC.

Though to be fair to Ms. Lagarde, harboring suspicions about recent action in the sovereign credit default swaps (C.D.S.) market hardly means you’re paranoid. Sovereign C.D.S are derivative contracts that work like an insurance policy against government debt default, though some investors use them simply to speculate on the likelihood of default. (Critics argue this is a bit like wagering on whether your neighbor’s house will burn down, but like everything else, it’s not that simple.)  Sovereign CDS are not traded on any exchange. And this lack of transparency has got critics wondering whether they’re suspectible to manipulation. Recently, Barclays Capital looked into the question of whether sovereign CDS are a good tool for measuring investor sentiment, or merely a way for speculators to sow fear of default, as European policy makers have complained. Their report, “Are Sovereign CDS the Canary in the Coalmine, or the Cat Among the Kittens?” concluded that the small size of the sovereign CDS market made it less predictive than the underlying market for government debt it’s meant to insure.

But then again, small markets are easier to manipulate. Enter the conspiracy theory: on Wednesday, Jean Quatremer, who reports on the Brussels beat for the French daily Liberation, broke the story that Goldman Sachs and the hedge fund run by John Paulson are behind the attacks against Greece and the euro…

The most shocking aspect of this affair is without doubt the role played by Goldman Sachs, which, while at the same time advising the Greek government, has also taken secret positions against Greece and the euro.

And this coming in the same week that it was reported in Der Spiegel and the New York Times that, back in 2002, Goldman helped the Greek government conceal some of its debts from the European Union through a series of complex derivative transactions.  The sole purpose of these transactions would appear to be to sidestep EU reporting requirements and paint a misleading picture of Greek finances. That news drew a lot of ire. Even the normally circumspect German Chancellor Angela Merkel lashed out, saying, “It’s a scandal if it turned out that the same banks that brought us to the brink of the abyss helped fake the [Greek] statistics.”

But potentially more damning is the assertion made by Mr. Quatremer, that Goldman Sachs has been taking advantage of its advisory role, and profiting at the expense of Greece.

… on 25th of January, Greece managed to place 8 billion euros in 5-year paper, even though the original intention had been to issue only 3 billion: demand had reached 25 billion euros! Goldman Sachs was certainly among the syndicate that placed this Greek paper. Up to that point, nothing out of the ordinary… After this spectacular success, everyone thought that the markets had calmed down… But then starting Wednesday [Jan. 27th] another storm hit. An article from the Financial Times… had just confirmed news to the effect that China had refused to buy 23 billion euros of Greek debt, a “private placement” engineered by . . . Goldman Sachs. What was this about? When a government fears that it won’t be able to place its debt, it asks a bank directly to place it on its behalf with one or several investors. It’s a sign of panic. And the fact that Beijing was said to have declined the offer was downright disturbing. In short, two reasons for the markets to flee Greece. [Athens] denied this, but the markets nevertheless increased the risk premium they assigned Greece, boosting [Goldman's] profits.

Of course, Goldman Sachs is a huge bank, with a massive derivatives business that entails managing tremendously complex and often offsetting positions. But if the story’s true, Goldman’s actions have been ethically dubious at best. And in the eyes of the European public, it all must seem downright nefarious.  Politicians respond to the public mood, and regulators in Europe don’t need much more motivation to start clamping down on financial market shenanigans. Already the new EU Internal Market Commissioner, Michel Barnier, has stated his intention to regulate the sovereign CDS market. But that’s just the tip of the iceberg. As he recently told Le Figaro, “No market, no actor, no product and no territory can go without relevant regulation and efficient supervision.” So, look out, markets: here come the regulators.

But for Goldman, at least in Europe, the tarnish on their image may be more worrisome. Goldman Sachs was already a lightning rod for conspiracy theory. Now this Greek episode may burn that image into Europe’s retina. As the French magazine Marianne recently put it, “How do you never lose? If you’re Goldman Sachs, you play from both sides of the table.” I can think of another group of people who profit no matter if their clients win or lose: arms dealers…

Well, it’s enough to start you thinking like a socialist!

]]> http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/2010/02/20/goldman-greece-its-all-one-big-conspiracy-man/feed/ http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/2010/02/10/david-beckham-landon-donovan-and-a-world-cup-rematch-60-years-in-the-making/ http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/2010/02/10/david-beckham-landon-donovan-and-a-world-cup-rematch-60-years-in-the-making/#comments Wed, 10 Feb 2010 18:22:45 +0000 Dan Levy http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/?p=936

The 1950 US National Soccer Team

On the 29th of June in 1950, the United States national soccer team pulled off one of the great upsets in the history of soccer. At the World Cup tournament in Brazil, they beat England, without question the dominant national team of their time with a roster boasting some of the best players in the professional game. None of the Americans were full-time pros, and they had lost each of their previous seven games with an aggregate score of 45-2. The English, for their part, had only lost three of their last 30 games. The US Head Coach William “Bill” Jeffrey confessed before the match: “We have no chance.”

Yet that day, at Independência Stadium in  Belo Horizonte, Team USA ran out 1-0 winners, a feat so shocking it’s known as the “Miracle on Grass”. It went on to provide the inspiration for a book and a 2005 feature film, and prompted USA defender Harry Keough to comment after the game: “Boy, I feel sorry for these b*stards. How are they ever going to live down the fact we beat them?” (1950, as it turned out, was a world cup chock-a-block with “greatest upsets in History”; the Uruguyan defeat of Brazil in the finals was so stunningly unexpected that the Brazilians changed their uniforms afterwards, fearing a jinx.)

David Beckham. Photo by CLF

60 years to the month, the two nations are set to lock horns again in a World Cup match for the very first time since. This 12th of June, they will contest the opening game of Group C in South Africa, and two players hoping to line up against one another in that game are currently plying their trade together stateside for the LA Galaxy. Teammates Landon Donovan and David Beckham have shared the Galaxy captaincy, as well as a war of words, since the latter’s controversial arrival in 2007. And with the World Cup squarely in their sights, both men are currently on loan to European soccer clubs during the Major League Soccer off-season.

Beckham, of course, is more than simply a player. He’s an international sports celebrity, who was brought to Los Angeles to help raise the profile of American professional soccer. Of course, as one would expect, his arrival has failed to stem the flow of top American players eager to put their abilities to the test across the Atlantic. Soccer clubs in Spain, Germany, Italy and England offer not only the crème de la crème in terms of competition, but also the wages to match. Whereas the opposite happens in the women’s game-the best women in England are usually lured to America-for the men, the top American pros flow to Europe.

Donovan was no exception. At a young age, his talent was clear, and he was widely courted by European clubs, yet he has always struggled to make his mark there. Until now, that is. The 27-year old striker has scored 42 goals in 120 outings with the American squad, still his potential wasn’t met when first moved to Germany’s Bayer Leverkusen at the age of 17. The young American striker has never caught his stride in Germany. Ultimately, he was loaned to the San Jose Earthquakes for what turned out to be four very successful years, which also featured a run to the World Cup quarterfinals in 2002. In 2005, he ventured to Europe once more, returning to Leverkusen, but ended up leaving, having failed to score a goal. Finally, he headed to the LA Galaxy, and yet more success in American soccer. Last season saw him named league MVP; he and Beckham took the Galaxy to the MLS Cup final.

Landon Donovan. Photo by Jarrett Campbell

But Europe hasn’t seen the last of Donovan. Done with Germany (after another disappointing spell in 2009), he has come instead to the English Premier League, and is finally showing Europe what he can do. In January, he joined American teammate Tim Howard at Everton, and is already making a big splash. British sportswriters are calling him the best signing of this season’s winter transfer window, and legendary pundit Mark Lawrenson has credited him with turning Everton’s fortunes around.

Indeed, it took just 12 minutes for that impact to be felt. On his debut outing, Donovan provided an assist with a delightful corner kick from which Leon Osman scored the first goal in a 2-2 draw on Arsenal’s home turf. It was an impressive Premier League debut that day in the driving snow. Though a draw, for his Everton teammates it meant redemption, since it was Arsenal that humiliated them 6-1 at Everton’s home field on opening day. Everton fans took to Donovan quickly. At his home field debut at Goodison Park in Liverpool, he left the field in the 91st minute to a standing ovation, after an impressive 2-0 win against Manchester City. This was also the game that truly marked the return to form of the talented Everton team, which has been hampered by injuries all season. Donovan continues to be a force at Goodison Park; he netted his first goal against Sunderland at the end of January. Before his arrival, Everton had won just five in 19 league outings. Immediately after, they went three for four. As you can imagine, Everton are looking keen to retain his services beyond the end of the season.

Beckham, surprisingly enough, also has something to prove during his three month stint in Europe. He wants to remain a part of England manager Fabio Capello’s World Cup plans. No other outfielder has played as many games for the English side as Beckham. All the same, he’s facing stiff competition for a place in the national team’s midfield. For now, he’s on loan to Italian giants AC Milan, where he spent January to May last year. Capello, it so happens, won the Italian league title with Milan, once as a player and four times as a manager (back when the team was bankrolled by a certain Silvio Berlusconi.) So there is scarcely a better place outside the English Premier for Mr. Spice Boy to get the attention of England’s manager.

That said, there’s still no guaranteed place for Beckham either on the English side, or even at AC Milan. Mr. Capello is known as a coach who won’t kowtow to big names or sentiment. He recently stripped John Terry of the England captaincy after revelations about the highly decorated Chelsea captain’s personal life. And Beckham will have to stay in top form simply to retain a starting place with the Rossoneri, as Milan are known, given the bumper crop of talent currently sporting their trademark red and black shirt. But the 34 year-old is managing it. He performed so well there last year that Milan wanted to take him away from Los Angeles to play for them on a permanent basis.

While Beckham is fighting for the chance to appear at his fourth consecutive World Cup tournament, Donovan, his LA Galaxy team-mate, is a sure-fire starter for a US team. The Americans beat current European Champions Spain on the way to the Confederations Cup final last year, and are currently ranked 14th in the FIFA World Rankings. England will still definitely be the favourites, just as they were 60 years ago, but if Donovan maintains his form, the USA will certainly not need another Miracle on Grass to have a chance against Beckham’s countrymen.

Eric Besson. Photo by Adam Tinworth

I went to the Paris meeting, because I wanted to see if, as advertised, the debate was a genuine attempt to come to terms with what it means to be a nation in postindustrial 21st-century Europe, or if it was merely an excuse to motivate the right wing vote and rile up the crazies. What I found was a little of both.

Outside the meeting, a young woman expressed to me what many suspect—that it’s all a gambit by an unpopular government and its divisive Immigration Minister, Eric Besson, to change the subject in an election year and monopolize discussion. “During the Mitterand era,” she said, “The question of immigration was used by the socialists under the pretext of fighting the National Front, as a way to rally the young. Now what Besson and Sarkozy are doing is practically the same. I think it’s a political tactic.” Except this time, it’s not the young they’re trying to rally, but the older, more conservative voters who are core supporters of Mr. Sarkozy’s ruling UMP party.

An old advertisment for the Paris Winter Circus

And the 16th is prime poaching for pensioners. This mostly affluent neighborhood hasn’t really been chic since “The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie” (1972) was shot here, and walking around, you get the feeling that that’s when many in the neighborhood took up residence. Certainly, there was a strong contingent of dapper men in excellent coats and well-turned-out ladies in furs at the conference room next to the athletic club founded by the baron Edmond de Rothschild in this swanky 70s building. One of the crowd, a very nice lady in a cashmere hat told me, “For me, it was a very interesting debate, except that I couldn’t hear everything… it should have been more calm, that’s all.” At which point, her husband piped up, “You’re an American journalist? It’s not any worse in the United States! I lived for two years in Iowa City, Iowa. You begin elections with the Iowa caucus, and this was about the same thing!”

In fact, the meeting did have that kind of feel. Something like half the crowd were retirees, another quarter were either journalists or attached to various politicians, and the rest were a mishmash of curious citizens, cranks and activists. Mr. Besson has been running all over France conducting these little “debates”, which are really more like town hall meetings, as part of the “grand national identity debate” announced by the Sarkozy government at the end of last year.

It goes without saying that it is a huge and unwieldy topic. And immediately, it raises a more practical question: how the heck can you even talk about it in a useful way? National identity sounds a lot like a code word for nationalism, minus the inconvenient historical baggage. Call it nationalism-lite. Some critics have questioned the wisdom of holding such a discussion to begin with. An open-ended debate on a heated topic with no clearly defined endpoint seems more like a recipe for stirring up the passions, not for promoting reconciliation.

Mr. Besson, on the government website setup for the debate, offers this rather windy justification:

…the excesses of nationalism, the development of new forms of ethnic identity and regionalism, the gradual creation of the European identity, and the accelerated globalization of trade appear to some to call into question the very idea of the nation. The often-asked question, what is a nation, that it makes individuals identify themselves body and soul with people they don’t even know, seems more relevant than ever.

So, Europe, History, Globalization, Ethnic identity (read: Muslims): how to make sense of it all? Here to answer your questions is Eric Besson, the national identity impresario, waxing on about the values of the French republic and the history of French immigration. And you kinda have to admire the guy for his aplomb—the way he fielded four our five questions at a time, cherry-picking the best questions and ignoring the uncomfortable ones. He praised a young woman of North African descent who considers herself French, and simply French; fended off the tirade of an old Lebanese gentleman raised in Paris, who’s convinced they don’t even teach French history in the schools anymore; agreed with another old gentleman about the threat of the thankfully small but growing minority of French Islamists, though of course he’s at pains to distinguish them from the vast majority of French Muslims; lectures a North African gentleman (grandson of a French World War II veteran) about the fact this a post-colonial period we live in, and that it’s time to put the old colonial discourse behind us; and warmly accepted an elderly lady’s heartfelt thanks for tackling such a difficult issue.

But then the initially polite crowd grew restive. A noisy and cantankerous klatch of ulta-right wing National Front supporters hogged the microphone for a while, with a series of questions about Jewish groups and illegal immigrants. Later, I asked one how he felt about the meeting and he said: “I thought we expressed ourselves openly. We all said our piece. We all listened. It wasn’t a debate just between the [main opposition] socialists and the UMP. All the parties expressed themselves, it’s true a bit forcefully at times. But’s that’s liberty. Just because we don’t agree with those in charge doesn’t make us extremists. That’s freedom of expression,” he exclaimed, and then repeated, “We’re not extremists.”

In the back of the room, a couple of voluble of young men with buzz cuts and dark suits barked when they didn’t like the minister’s answers. The crowd grew uneasy. Next, a bearded man with spiky hair took the microphone and read some prepared remarks.

We are pleased this evening to raise the level of the “great debate over national identity”. A debate that smells rancid in a country closed in on itself, a hollow debate that turns Arabs and Muslims into scapegoats instead of ensuring social justice, a debate that excludes instead of establishing a real equality of rights between each and every resident of this country. A debate that is nauseating…

At which point, the crowd emitted a spontaneous moan, and the man, part of a leftwing protest group called “the Pink Panthers,” pretended to vomit, spraying something from a can onto the floor. Here’s the video:

The group chanted for a while, then were escorted out. The local UMP politician and host of the evening, Bernard Debré, fustigated before the crowd, “What you have just seen here is an example of fascism!” After that outburst, things settled down. It was hard to escape the feeling that the evening has crossed over into farce. The attendees headed to the exit looked visibly relieved.

In the hallway, folks were less than enthused about how the debate turned out. A lady of a certain age with a blond bob, who told me she works in politics, called the debate “animated”, but didn’t think the minister said anything new. While outside, another lady brooding over an ultra-slim cigarette was scathing. “Yeah, it was interesting,” she granted, “but there are other problems that we should be occupying ourselves with besides the burqa and national identity. What gets me, is everyday there are people dying in the streets and nobody does anything about it.”

Women wearing the niqab in Turkey. Relatively rare in France, the French parliamentary debate to have it banned has drawn criticism from the left and from members of President Sakozy's ruling party. Mr. Sarkozy has sought to avoid an outright ban, which many feel would provoke a backlash and mostly likely conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights.

The young woman who earlier drew comparisons between this debate and the Mitterand era told me that she came to tonight’s meeting because she had attended one the previous week in Créteil, a suburb to the southeast of Paris that is home to many recent immigrants and people of north African origin. “I wanted to see how it would go in a rich neighborhood,” she said. “In Creteil. the room where they held the debate was pretty empty. Here, it was standing room only, and the majority were elderly.”

If it was the intention of the Sarkozy government to use these debates to grab the attention of their supporters and the media, then they’ve had a fair degree of success.  However, the polls suggest that the public isn’t wholly comfortable with the way the debate has been conducted. As the minister of Immigration and national identity, it is appropriate that Besson should moderate the discussion.  Except, he is far from a conciliatory figure. A socialist turncoat who defected from socialist presidential candidate Segolène Royale’s campaign in its closing weeks to join the Sarkozy camp, he has embraced his role as hatchet man for the administration’s tough stance on illegal immigration with the zeal of the converted. More recently, Mr. Sarkozy has had to backtrack on his confrontational stance over the niqab—the full body garment that the French persistently and incorrectly call the burqa—the whole hullabaloo has dominated the headlines nevertheless.

The irony, of course, is this “grand debate,” though nominally about the French, is really focused on French anxieties about those who are not French, or only recently French—the influx of immigrants and children of immigrants, illegal or otherwise, who are making French national culture increasingly difficult to define.

One could argue that simply holding a debate on national identity presupposes that there is a problem.  It is far from clear that national identity should be an easy thing to define—that would assume a narrow and backward-looking notion of identity. Happily, our 21st century self-conception is harder to pigeonhole, because it is more elusive and diffuse. Every one of us, individually, is a harmony of cultural, social, regional, ethnic, religious, gender, political and personal traits. And a noisy, trumped-up debate about national identity can’t drown our collective symphony.

Raymond Domenech. Source: Wikimedia

It’s when the job qualifications don’t seem particularly high that the anger can turn really toxic. Few would consider themselves fit to head the World Bank, for example, or direct a $100+ million dollar motion picture, but plenty of folks feel they could coach a soccer team. This is why Raymond Domenech, coach of the French national soccer team, inspires such fanatical loathing in French fans. And ever since the French team’s embarrassing victory over the Irish in November, the chorus of armchair coaches has been calling for his head.  (More on this is a moment.)

Mr. Domenech has coached les Bleus, as the French team is known, since 2004. Things were rocky from the start. That year, les Bleus struggled to qualify for the 2006 World Cup. Zinedine Zidane, or Zizou as he’s known, came out of retirement just to play the tournament, and thanks to his brilliant on-field leadership, the team rallied. They upset  Brazil, who were favored to win in the quarterfinals, before narrowly losing to Italy on tiebreaker penalties in the final match of the World Cup. Few, of course, credited Domenech, since Zizou was the superstar—one of that rarified group that includes Maradona and Pelé. Crediting Domenech would have been like blaming the Bulls’ success on Phil Jackson. Anyway, Zidane’s performance in the last three games of the cup was characteristically intense and inspired, right up to his ejection from the final match for head-butting Marco Materazzi in response to an alleged racist taunt. (The French of course promptly forgave him his inglorious exit.)

Not so Mr. Domenech, who lost whatever flimsy halo he had garnered just two years later. At the 2008 European football championships, les Bleus, sans Zizou, were shown a humiliating exit from the first round. First the Dutch dealt them their worst tournament loss in over 30 years—a 4-1 drubbing. After the Italians spanked them 2-0, Mr. Domenech’s term as coach seemed in doubt. France Soir, the French daily, ran a cover that implored him: Resign! But Mr. Domenech hung on. French soccer’s governing body, the French Football Federation (FFF), decided, not entirely without reason, that the coach who took les Bleus to finals of the 2006 World Cup deserved another shot.

Louis XVI. Not a Good Football Coach.

Then in 2009, history repeated itself: France again struggled to qualify for the World Cup. Les Bleus barely managed to squeak into the tournament, defeating the Irish on a winning goal scored by William Gallas, off an assist by striker Thierry Henry, who obviously and egregiously hand-balled, twice, yet got away with it. It was an embarrassing way to win. The French had played a lackluster, disorganized game against a lesser Irish team. And many, including France largest sports daily, L’Equipe, fingered Domenech. Former French national player Eric Cantona said, “I think that Raymond Domenech is the worst coach in French football since Louis XVI.”

Of course, you’re only as good as your last win; that truth haunts every coach in every sport. But this doesn’t fully explain Mr. Domenech’s vilification. It’s his style. Many are baffled by his tactics, which he never deigns to explain. The roster of players he calls up for the national team is often quirky and inexplicable, and bizarrely, influenced by astrology. He once blamed his stormy relationship with veteran winger Robert Pirès on the fact that Pirès is a Scorpio. Also, he’s admitted that he thinks Leos aren’t good defenders. “When I’ve got a Leo on defense, I’ve always got my gun ready” he once said. “I know he’s going to want to show off at one moment or another and cost us.” It must be quite a source of anxiety for him, seeing as how William Gallas, a Leo, anchors the French defense.

Leos. Not Good at Defense.

But one gets the sense, watching his press conferences, that anxiety and self-reflection are regions Domenech never really visits. He seems to prefer self-regard to self-criticism. But hey, who doesn’t? In his case, however, it’s a question of degree. Unlike lesser coaches, who when asked whether they intended to resign after a humiliating loss to the Italians in the Euro Cup might use a press conference to, say, explain what happened, Domenech chose the moment to propose to his girlfriend, French TV personality Estelle Denis. “I have only one project,” he answered reporters, “to marry Estelle, which is what I’m asking her today.” Unsurprisingly, the French media pounced on the comments as inappropriate, but he was unapologetic. “Everything was so sad,” he later explained. “I thought life has some beautiful moments and you should tell people you love them. I wanted to show some emotion.”

Franck Ribery. Born in April.

To his credit, Mr. Domenech has proved an occasionally inspired talent scout, despite (or who knows, maybe because of?) his mystical hiring policies. He has definitely unearthed a few diamonds among the unknowns called up to the national team, such as strikers Andre-Pierre Gignac (Sagittarius) and Bafetimbi Gomis (Leo). For the 2006 World Cup, Domenech famously rejected veteran Barcelona winger Ludovic Giuly in favor of an untested midfielder from Marseille named Franck Ribery. Ribery is now regarded as one of the best French midfielders of his generation. He’s also an Aries.

Yet the problem for the beleaguered French coach is that, considering the star-studded squad he manages, anything less than strong results in the World Cup in South Africa this June will probably dissatisfy French fans. According to  Futebol Finance, as of March 2009, six of the 50 highest paid players in the world wear the tricolor jersey. That compares to seven for the absolutely awesome Spanish side and eleven for perennially disappointing England.  Yet, if you believe in the predictive power of markets, then maybe this will be the year for the richly remunerated English. (The English could actually win. Yes, it is possible.) World Cup favorites Brazil have just 5 players on that list (except, two of them are Kaka and Robihno, nuff said.)

There may be hope for the French, considering how poorly they performed during the run-up to the 2006 World Cup, and that worked out.  Yes, but they had Zizou. This time, the stars and planets may not align  for Domenech.

Prime Minister George Papandreou

But they couldn’t dispel the impression that European support for Greece is by no means unconditional. European Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Joaquin Almunia told Spain’s El Pais newspaper “If Greece does not take the necessary measures to overcome its problems, the euro zone won’t be able to take them in the name of Greece.” Hans-Werner Sinn, President of Germany’s Ifo Institute for Economic Research, was more blunt: “The euro zone will not break apart because of Greece. It is too small for that. But it could be the next Lehman Brothers.”

Here we all thought it was time to breathe easy. After Monday’s announcement that Abu Dhabi would extend a $10 billion lifeline to neighboring emirate Dubai, it was hoped that the Greek financial scare would also recede. Yet Dubai shook investors’ faith in every sovereign or quasi-sovereign entity whose credit quality depends on unofficial assurances. And that fits Greece to a tee. The land of Plato, gyros and the unstilled Cyclades has a debt load of 300 billion Euros, greater than 110% of its GDP; still it’s been able to continue borrowing from the European Central Bank (ECB). Then came the recent surprise upward revision of its budget deficit to 12.7% of GDP. This prompted the Fitch downgrade. Investors and other credit agencies have since begun to worry that there is, in fact, no guarantee against a Greek default.

Surely, the mixed messages from European central bankers—fearing the moral hazard of promising too much too soon, when the onus is on the Greek government to clean up its books—haven’t helped. As recently as last week, Axel Weber, President of the Bundesbank, was warning that the ECB might stop accepting Greek bonds as collateral. In normal times, the ECB accepts only A-rated securities at its liquidity window. This was relaxed to BBB- during the financial crisis. Since then, the ECB has let it be known that the new, laxer standard would only remain until the end of 2010. With its bonds now triple B+, Greece will have to get its rating boosted—a tall order, considering the parlous state of the Greek budget—or see its banks cut off from their source of funding. It goes without saying that this would be disastrous. And yet, just a day earlier, ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet, was sounding a grave but conciliatory tone:

The situation in Greece is very difficult. We all know the figures and we all know the important and cautious decisions that will have to be taken to put the situation back on track, the situation as regards to fiscal policy. So this calls for very difficult, very courageous but absolutely necessary measures. I am confident that the government of Greece will … take the appropriate measures.

Maybe Trichet and Weber are playing good cop, bad cop? If so, it backfired. Prime Minister George Papandreou disappointed the markets, who wanted a clear signal that the government was willing to cut costs and raise taxes. Instead, Mr. Papandreou presented a modest plan Monday night. His numbers did sound good and ambitious: he committed to slashing the budget gap from 12.7% of GDP to under 3% of GDP within four years. But his proposals were medium term. They may not be enough to help next year’s budget situation—a mix of one-off tax measures, minor cuts in Social Security and public sector spending, and an eye-popping 90% tax on bankers’ bonuses. While certain to guarantee that no Greek banker receives a bonus next year, the plan is likely to fall short of what’s needed. So, the market voted with its feet. By Tuesday morning, Greece’s 5-year sovereign credit default swaps, which measure the likelihood of default, had spiked to 201 basis points, up from 170 bps before the Fitch downgrade.

The 2008 Greek Riots. Photo by Tom Tziros

So here’s the problem: considering the shaky state of Greek politics right now (Mr. Papandreou and Co. still have last year’s riots in the back of their minds) and the feeble state of the Greek economy (demand is expected to fall by 3% in real terms next year) it may be politically and practically impossible for the Greek leader to impose the kind of austerity measures needed to bring their fiscal house in order. And if, as some claim, Greece’s debts are actually far higher than the official figures, some form of intervention to prevent a Greek default may be inevitable. Many fear that a Greek default would go pandemic in Europe, and spread to the other weak economies, like Ireland, Spain and Portugal. Indeed, Angela Merkel has already hinted that some sort of European alternative to the IMF may be necessary. The question is, though, whether the Greek government and Greek voters would be able to stomach the kind of stringent medicine it would entail. And considering the degree of mistrust of Greece by European finance ministers, there would have to be some uncomfortable scrutinizing of the Greek government’s books. (Observers have speculated that Greek governments may have “fudged the numbers” to achieve the convergence criteria for accession into the Euro.)

So what then? Greek voters are going to have to take a long hard look at the benefits of membership in the EU, and weigh them against the economic pain that an austerity plan could afflict. In July, the OECD concluded that to bring Greek government debt down to less than 60% of GDP within 10 to 15 years, the budget deficit will have to be eliminated altogether within the next five years. The Greek state, in other words, needs a complete revamp, otherwise it’s going to go broke. But the sting of such a massive structural readjustment will undoubtedly cause many in Greece to question the benefits of EU membership.

Likewise, many Europeans may wonder whether it’s really necessary to bear the cost of preventing a Greek default. For years, it seems like Greek governments have acted in bad faith on the financial front. Though far from alone in overshooting the three percent budget deficit target laid out in the EU Growth and Stability pact, (since post-crisis and recession, swollen budget deficits are general across Europe), Greece stood alone as the only member state that had taken “no effective action” to address its shortfalls, according to the European commission. This in a year when other members, like Ireland, have faced the gloomy proposition of cutting government spending in a downturn.

Fear of a backlash by Mr. Papandreou's public sector supporters, like the 2007 general strike shown above, may be limiting the scope of proposed reforms. Photo by Tom Tziros.

The Irish did succeed, nevertheless, in avoiding a far greater financial catastrophe.  And that highlights one of the unexpected benefits of the financial crisis in Europe: the crisis has been a stress test, not just for European banks, but for the union itself. It has increased policy coordination among member states; the ECB has been able to fashion a role for itself as de facto lender of last resort; and small countries have come to see the benefit of being in a large economic tent when the financial gales blow.

But that still leaves one last glaring hole in the European system—what economists call the “free rider” problem. What do you do about countries unwilling or unable to achieve the structural reforms necessary for long-run compliance with the European Growth & Stability Pact? As result of its budgetary failure, Greece has now ventured down an untraveled path. The EU commission has begun, in fact for the first time, the enforcement process, as laid out by the pact. If the Greek government fails to demonstrate to the EU commission tangible evidence of permanent reform, this could trigger fines and penalties—remedies no one hoped would ever be necessary. And this begs the question that hitherto few have wanted to consider: should the EU develop exit mechanisms from the monetary union, on either a temporary or permanent basis? It would be a staggering choice to make. The political calculus alone would overwhelm the economic considerations, especially for members whose democratic institutions are young, and who have benefited, as has Greece, from the shoring up that the older democracies of Europe provided it.

Greece could be a test case for other, larger economies that refuse to play by the rules down the road. The Greeks may muddle through, but financial crises also have a way of forcing everyone’s hands.

Part of the problem is that the German economy relies too much on trade. This has resulted in a wage trap, wherein worries over the competitiveness of its high value exports in a strong Euro world have kept wages stagnant. In recent years, Germany’s powerful unions have not pressed for wage increases in order to preserve employment. And last year, the country’s notoriously scrimping consumers spent only 56% of GDP compared with 70% in the US. It is a slow growing, mature economy—less resilient than the more service sector-oriented, free-spending French—and its population is only growing older. According to the German government, there are more people over the age of 65 than under the age of 20 living in Germany today. The population is projected to drop by 3.5 million people in 2020, yet the proportion of over 65 year-olds will continue to grow. Over the long run, this threatens to overwhelm the pensions and healthcare system.

The chancellor’s bet is that cutting taxes, but keeping spending steady, will boost Germany’s rate of growth, create jobs, lift tax revenues and put the social system on firmer footing. But many doubt Ms. Merkel’s math, and fear her program will simply create endless budget deficits, as have plagued the United States after decades of tax cuts. Most damning, the Council of Economic Advisers, the so-called “wise men”, (actually four men plus one woman), denounced the plan as “vague” and “deceptive”. They attacked it for its conspicuous lack of a “comprehensive exit strategy” from the structural deficits it would create.

The Gipper

Over the weekend, members of Merkel’s own Christian Democratic Union party (CDU) were in open revolt. The Premier of Schleswig-Holstein, Peter Harry Carstensen, reportedly threatened to resign unless his state was compensated for revenue lost under the plan. Without Mr. Carstensen’s support, it is unlikely the stimulus plan will pass the Bundesrat, or upper house of parliament. What’s more, Thuringia’s Premier, Christine Lieberknecht, told ZDF television she intended to vote against the measure. “Out of responsibility for the state and the budget,” she announced, “we cannot agree to it.”

The rancor within her own party, and the open disputes between the CDU and its junior coalition partner, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), have come as a surprise. Many expected the days of bickering should have ended along with the outgoing “grand coalition”, which lumped the CDU together with their social democratic (SPD) opponents in an uncomfortable four year partnership. In part, the contentious atmosphere owes to the brash and relatively young FDP leaders Ms. Merkel has invited into her government. Led by incoming foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, the liberals were the standout success of the last election—remarkable, considering they were a dying party as recently as ten years ago. “The financial crisis has provided an opportunity for the FDP to bring their opposition agenda into the coalition,” Paul Vallet, associate professor at the American Graduate School in Paris, told the Faster Times. “They feel like they are in a position to wield a lot of influence in the new government. At the same time, Merkel is the one in power with [all] the experience. The FDP have been out of power for 11 years. So they don’t have as much leverage as they might have supposed.” The tense atmosphere also reflects the simple fact that in German politics, tax cuts are a live wire.

Guido Westerwelle. Photo by Poeloq

In reality, the Reagan-Merkel comparison begins and ends with tax cuts. The German federal system forces its leadership to take an extremely consultative and consensus-oriented approach to decision making. In fact, the methodical and deliberative Ms. Merkel is a German leader par excellence. Should it pass, it’s likely that the FDP’s aggressive tax cut hopes will be considerably watered down; and that may have been her intention all along. But nothing will lessen the irony of such a very un-German approach to saving the German system, by breaking the rules of tight money, low deficits, and high rates of saving.

“The social market model,” Mr. Vallet points out, “is like the national cement.” And it is something—not merely for the postwar generation, but also for the post-reunification generation—that is increasingly viewed as part of the German identity. In a nation that abhors nationalism for obvious historical reasons, he adds, “the social market model is a concept that they are finally becoming comfortable with as an expression of national patriotic pride.”

The question is whether it will prove flexible enough to survive in the 21st century.

Herman Van Rompuy. Photo by Luc Van Braekel

Media outlets in particular grumbled over their unfulfilled wish for a celebrity politician, who could have played the president’s role with newsworthy élan. The take-away was that this was yet another example of the drab, consensual politics that dominates the EU, and that such colorless figures cannot clear up the leadership muddle that the Lisbon treaty was meant to fix. Spain’s El País openly worried that these two “gray, unknowns” would compound the estrangement between EU citizens and their institutions. In the Nouvel Observateur, former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing complained that the choice reflected “a limited ambition for Europe at a time of grand global dialogue… [Van Rompuy] is no European Washington.” And Gideon Rachman at the Financial Times compared the process of selection to a computer-dating program gone terribly wrong. “If the answer is Herman Van Rompuy and Cathy Ashton,” he fumed, “what the hell was the question?”

So much for Tony Blair, who was, until recently, assumed to be the front-runner for the new top post. (Though in reality, this was an idea that mainly fired up English-speaking imaginations. Most “Anglo-Saxons”, as the French weirdly call us, still don’t fully appreciate how roundly Europeans resent Blair for the role he played ginning up public support for the invasion of Iraq.)

For those readers who don’t follow EU politics with all the verve of a comparative government advanced placement student, two of the major changes introduced by the recently ratified Treaty of Lisbon were the creation of a “president” of the EU and also a head diplomat, who could speak for all the foreign ministers of Europe. Many feel that the European Union, which houses 500 million people and has the largest GDP in the world, punches well below its weight on the world stage. In practice, its leadership is diluted—divided between the larger countries of Europe, who individually and collectively don’t seem to have as much pull these days as presidents Obama and Hu.

To this end, it’s obvious Mr. Van Rompuy and Lady Ashton are no remedy; they are the sort of non-threatening backroom picks that the risk-averse European leadership seem to prefer. This is particularly true of Lady Ashton, who, with no foreign policy experience, got the job as a concession to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown for abandoning the Blair bid. This is unfortunate, but such is the horse-trading that determines how most EU positions are divvied out—a far from ideal recruitment strategy.

However, before we get carried away bemoaning lost opportunities, it’s worth taking a closer look at the former Belgian prime minister’s new job description, because the job is not quite as presidential as it sounds. For the next two and a half years, it will be his responsibility to chair and steer the work of the European Council, and also to serve as its spokesman. Unlike Lady Ashton, who will head the newly formed European diplomatic corps, Mr. Van Rompuy will have no formal power, and very little administrative power. Mostly, his presence will ensure greater continuity on the council, which is made up of the leaders of Europe. His office will replace the old, rotating six-month presidency and the inevitable short-termism it fostered. Merkel and Sarkozy reportedly favored Van Rampuy for his reputation as a consensus-builder, which is probably wise, since persuasion is about the only power he’s going to have.

Some critics, however, have sought to portray European leaders as jealous of their own power. Parisian socialist deputy Jean-Christophe Cambadélis told le Nouvel Observateur:

“The hand of Sarkozy and Merkel in the choice of Van Rompuy and Ashton has achieved its goal: to render the European presidency and the High Representative for Foreign Policy banal… we cannot be but sorry.”

If indeed that was the goal—to safeguard the prerogatives of national leaders and their foreign ministers against a more assertive EU leadership—then the members may have inadvertently hit upon a wise choice. But in a broader sense, the decision of Sarkozy, Merkel and Co. reflects the emerging view that after a dizzying decade of enlargement and integration, the onus is on the EU now to demonstrate good governance. Considering the general queasiness about the Union’s democratic deficit the appointment of a swaggering, undemocratic spokesman as its president might have been unwise. It would likely have stoked the kind of popular revolt already seen in Ireland, France, and the Netherlands. Anyway, from a longer-term perspective, there really is something to be said for bland inaugural leaders.

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s invocation of George Washington is probably more apt than the former French President realizes; the thing is, he got the comparison wrong. Hype and hagiography aside, Washington was the essence of the bland, consensus leader. Arguably, the two most significant things that our first president did were 1) to listen to Alexander Hamilton and nationalize the war debts of the former colonies (which tied the states to the federal government financially and created a robust domestic financial market that kept us independent of English capital markets, something other fledgling American democracies failed to do), and 2) to step down after eight years, without trying to become an American dictator. Washington’s dignified (read: boring) inaugural presidency ensured that the office has always loomed larger than whoever holds it; we don’t constantly compare our current Commander in Chief with Washington.

The problem with charismatic founding leaders is that their personality exceeds the office. Assuming that Blair had succeeded, and that’s quite an assumption, then two and a half years from now, when he stepped down, the question wouldn’t be “who should be the next president” it would be “who can fill Blair’s shoes?” This is, to a certain extent, a flaw of the French Fifth republic: the French presidency was tailor-made for de Gaulle, and every president since has governed in his shadow.

Maybe it is just too early in the life of the EU to hang it with all the trappings of a super powerful nation state. It is not a military superpower; neither is it a nation state: it is a work in progress. Yet, as is typical of EU politics, pro-Europeans argue as if its very survival and relevance were at stake. This is emerging as one of the most predictable aspects of EU politics: every time a treaty is voted down or enlargement suffers a setback or an uncharismatic leader is appointed to a post, it’s as though the whole damn effort were under existential threat.

Imagine the Fins, the Poles and the Brits speaking as one. Truly, it may take a generation for a trans-European political culture to emerge. For now, the politics of consensus, gray and uninspiring though it is, is probably the only workable way to group the disparate voices of Europe into a single voice, and forge a common EU foreign policy. The notion that a charismatic leader could fast-forward this is probably wishful thinking.

In the meantime, we’ll have to make do with Caspar Van Milquetoast.

]]> http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/2009/11/22/let%e2%80%99s-hear-it-for-milquetoast-why-europeans-should-quit-complaining-about-their-colorless-new-leaders/feed/ http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/2009/11/10/whats-next-%e2%80%9csex-and-the-city%e2%80%9d-at-the-louvre/ http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/2009/11/10/whats-next-%e2%80%9csex-and-the-city%e2%80%9d-at-the-louvre/#comments Tue, 10 Nov 2009 12:51:46 +0000 Caroline Rossiter http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/?p=789 Museum directors in France are courting celebrity chic, promoting Pop Art in some of the art world’s most conservative venues, like the Louvre and Versailles. Though it’s unlikely that efforts to spice up these bastions of French orthodoxy will leave more than a small scratch on their stuffy walls, it’s a welcome scuff mark nonetheless.

Joseph Kosuth, "ni apparence ni illusion" © Musée du Louvre/Antoine Mongodin

At the Louvre, contemporary artist Joseph Kosuth is the latest to bring a touch of l’air du temps to its hallowed halls. After Jan Fabre’s intervention amongst the Northern paintings last year, Kosuth has chosen the medieval foundations of the museum for his installation of neon signs. Fifteen verbal meditations are installed against the dimly lit Louvre walls, giving off a slightly eery light (especially in the quieter crypt). The title of the exhibition, ni apparence ni illusion (neither appearance nor illusion), is a Nietzsche quote. Unusually for Kosuth, who likes to quote literary and philosophical sources, the rest of the words in the exhibition are of his own composition, and invite the visitor to reflect on the ancient foundations of the place and question their relationship to history and archaeology.

One of Kosuth’s phrases reads, “The stones of the wall are signed, and yet each one remains anonymous.” This may be true of the Louvre, but it’s no longer the situation at Vaux le Vicomte, the chateau whose grandiose gardens inspired Versailles. In the gift shop, there is a glass case displaying signed photos of Eva Longoria, Nicolette Sheridan and the rest of the cast of “Desperate Housewives”. These grinning snapshots are completely incongruous with the rest of the chateau, which is otherwise commited to conservation and historical accuracy. Nicolette and company took part in a beefed up version of the “have your name on a grain of rice” offer, where guests sponsor individual roof tiles for the chateau, when they were on site for the lavish wedding of Eve Longoria and French basketball hero Tony Parker in 2007.

Vaux le Vicomte. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Of course, a big shot contemporary artist enjoying a cameo at the Louvre is not quite as grave as a cheap-looking display of celeb-signed photos at a famous chateau. But what, in both cases, are these museum directors trying to achieve here? Are they trying to attract a younger, celebrity-savvy audience? Joseph Kosuth undoubtedly lacks the mass appeal of a hit TV series, but his name, nevertheless, can still lure an alternative crowd to the Louvre.

If grabbing attention is indeed the gameplan, then the approach is garnering a certain amount of success—the Jeff Koons show at Versailles last year provoked a bilious response from some. Notable was an open letter to the President from one Prince Charles-Emmanuel de Bourbon-Parme, descendant of the Bourbon Kings and Louis XIV himself. De Bourbon-Parme denounced the show for being disrespectful and “pornographic” and demanded its early closure.

Balloon Dog, by Jeff Koons. Photo by Jean-Piere Dalbera

Other commentators complained that the show merely cast light on the new royalty—France’s cultural elite. On one incestuous billboard, it united François Pinault, entrepreneur, richest man in France and notable Koons’s collector, with Jean-Jacques Aillagon, the new director of Versailles and ex-advisor to Pinault and to Koons. (Though perhaps Koons is, conceptually at least, not terribly out of place at Versailles, given its history of riches, power and excess.) And last but not least, add to these grievances the tourists, who didn’t want to spend their once-in-a-lifetime visit to Versailles looking at Koons’ inflatable dogs and self aggrandizing self-portraits.

Koons, as is his want (see his “Made in Heaven”, currently on show as part of Tate Modern’s controversial Pop Life exhibition), was a sensation at Versailles.  The current guest artist on display,  however, Xavier Veilhan, favors a more subtle approach. Veilhan’s works, like Kosuth’s, are specifically designed for the space they inhabit, and are much less intrusive than the Koons retrospective. Veilhan’s predominantly sculptural works include a contemporary take on a horse-drawn carriage, a monumental hanging mobile and statues dedicated to his architectural heroes dotted around the gardens of Versailles.

Mobile, by Xavier Veilhan

Will such contemporary cultural figures manage to muscle their way into established French art and heritage institutions? The answer is probably not. Just as the cast of Desperate Housewives looked small and out of place in their signed photos, Joseph Kosuth and Xavier Veilhan’s installations are dwarfed by the immensity of their locations.

But these contemporary showings are no flop, either. Certainly the Louvre, which attracted 8.5 million visitors in 2008, and Versailles, where visitors stand in line for hours, don’t need to dabble in contemporary art to secure their place on the tourist map. So perhaps they should be commended for their commitment to the new. Their efforts won’t necessarily elevate contemporary artists to the level of da Vinci and Le Nôtre, but a least they can keep museums from becoming mausoleums of past acheivements.

Next up at Versailles is Japanese artist Takashi Murakami, whose—sometimes obscene—manga-pop aesthetic may prove even harder to fit into Versailles, both aesthetically and conceptually. This next installment of contemporary mayhem is going to keep the museum and the public on their toes.

Ni apparence ni illusion is on in the Sully Wing of the Louvre until 06/21/2010
Xavier Veilhan is exhibiting at the Chateau de Versailles until 12/13/2009
Jeff Koons is on show in Pop Life at Tate Modern until 01/17/2010
Takashi Murakami will be on show in Versailles in 2010

“Nicholas” overtly, so. The movie plays on its audience’s yearning for little schoolboy outfits, crisp gray-suited men driving shiny Peugeot 404s, and coiffed hysterical housewives vacuuming in neat dresses.

Haneke’s film, by contrast, though not nostalgic in the normal sense, nevertheless seeks out, and to a certain extent constructs, a time and setting, where the prevailing ethos was so clearly wrong-headed that it’s easy to make a moral case. German prewar society, “The White Ribbon” seems to suggest, was just plain awful. Yet his little German village is more like a dystopia than a living, breathing place, distilled in frigid black and white. And though the plot is elusive and cleverly constructed—Haneke is congenitally predisposed against tidy plots—the moral, about the dangers of authoritarian education, is made abundantly clear.

It all begins when the town doctor is thrown from his horse while riding home. As in “Hand-Carved Coffins” by Truman Capote, someone has strung a wire between the trees. Thus begins a series of acts of escalating violence, a revenge story turned on its head, though at first, the crimes don’t seem to be related. One suspects the children may be involved, somehow. In any event, we have a pretty good notion of what’s fueling it all—the crushing protestant ethic embodied by the town pastor, played with unremitting force by Burghart Klaußner. Here’s a man whose moral indignation knows no bounds. We watch him castigate his own daughter in front of the catechism class, while she’s forced to stare at a wall, until eventually, she collapses.

Like the pasquinades in Garcia Marquez’s “In Evil Hour”—the anonymous lampoons posted on walls that have everyone in town at each other’s throats—the accumulation of crimes in “The White Ribbon” ultimately leads to the village’s unraveling, and soon the big city cops are called in. They turn out to have all the charm of a couple of brownshirts; it’s hard to miss the foreshadowing of Nazism in their style of interrogation. Indeed, in interviews, Mr. Haneke has left no mystery as to how he feels his film ought to be interpreted. As he told der Spiegel:

When strictness becomes an end in itself, and when an idea turns into ideology, it becomes perilous for anyone who doesn’t comply with this ideology. The film uses the example of German fascism to talk about the mental preconditions for every type of terrorism… whenever people are in hopeless, unhappy and humiliating situations, they will grasp at any straw that is handed to them.

Yet his film chooses too easy a target to make this point effectively; it speaks with the moral certainty of hindsight. Nowadays, anti-totalitarian belief is the reigning cultural doctrine in Germany.  So what, then, are the “mental preconditions” that account for the current rise of xenophobic anti-immigrant political parties in the former East Germany? The answer, no doubt, is complicated, and socioeconomic, and can’t be pawned off on ideology, or an over zealous protestant minister.

It is a hallowed tradition in film that uses the child’s perspective to put on display the absurdity of the adult world, with its arbitrary, rules-based regime, which adults themselves are so often breaking. Francois Truffaut’s “400 Blows” is the epitome of the genre, an indictment of the callous conformism of 1950’s French education. What is really amazing when you watch “Le petit Nicholas” is not its nostalgic, mid-century portrayal of Paris. This is a kid’s film, after all; we recognize that this is the Paris of “Ratatouille.” No, what’s amazing is that the film manages a fondness for the sort of classroom cruelty that Truffaut so castigated. Yet here in Nicholas, the class dunce is a running gag, plus it’s not very funny.

Worse, the film’s other gags are phoned-in, like an unfunny version of “A Christmas Story.” The teacher’s pet warns off potential attackers with the admonition, “don’t hit me, I’m wearing glasses”, but wait until the eye doctor comes to school… smack! And then there’s the part where all the kids are in the Rolls Royce and someone accidentally releases the emergency break—look out!

I really struggled to think of a recent American film—kids film or otherwise—that so unabashedly idealized the 1950s quite like this, without some small hint of the social tensions of the era. One imagines it would require a kind of knowing kitsch entirely missing from “Le petit Nicholas.” Also missing from “Le petit Nicholas”: immigrants.

In the end, it would all seem pretty harmless, if the French government hadn’t recently opened a national debate about “French identity”.  It  was announced on Monday by Eric Besson, Minister for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development. (Honestly, that’s his title.) Among other things, Mr. Besson wants to know if part of the reason why French kids aren’t prouder of being French is because they don’t sing the Marseillaise often enough. And he lashed out against the Burqa, too.  Forgive us for tempting Godwin’s law, but the first aspect of fascism, according to Robert Paxton’s definition, is a politics “marked by an obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victim-hood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity.”  Sometimes gratuitous nostalgia, when considered before certain backdrops, can seem pretty menacing, even in a kids’ film.

]]> http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/2009/10/28/what-does-michael-hanekes-new-film-have-in-common-with-a-kids-movie/feed/ http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/2009/10/18/heavy-weighs-the-crown-on-sarkozys-head/ http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/2009/10/18/heavy-weighs-the-crown-on-sarkozys-head/#comments Sun, 18 Oct 2009 16:16:42 +0000 Jule Treneer http://thefastertimes.com/westerneurope/?p=725 It’s been a scandalous couple of weeks in French politics, at least for sons and nephews of French presidents. It’s also been brutal for President Nicolas Sarkozy. As fresh signs emerge that his popularity among his core constituency has taken a major battering, it seems like Sarko’s high-handed, monarchical style of governing is finally catching up to him.  More generally, this upwelling of public anger has shone a light on the complicated, love/hate relationship the French have with their aristocratic elites.

First up: Frédéric Mitterrand, nephew of former socialist president François Mitterrand and Minister of Culture in the Sarkozy administration. It all started a couple weeks ago over an emotional, televised outburst at Roman Polanski’s arrest, which he called “absolutely horrifying”. Polanski, he maintained, had been “thrown to the lions because of ancient history.” Yet, as a member of the Sarkozy government, Mr. Mitterrand was speaking way out of turn. More than impolitic, his overreaction was  also completely out of step with French public opinion. Surprisingly enough, polls show that 65-75% of voters actually agree that Roman Polanski ought to be extradited to the US.

A socialist, like his late uncle, Mr. Mitterrand is the first openly gay senior French minister, one of a handful of political appointments plucked from outside Sarkozy’s ruling party. Rivals like ultra-rightwing nationalist Marine Le Pen jumped at the opportunity to denounce Mitterrand with charges of hypocrisy, and worse. At issue is his 2005 autobiography, titled “La Mauvaise Vie”, literally “The Bad Life,” in which he related his experiences with “young boys” as a sexual tourist in Asia. Here’s how he described one such experience in an Asian sex club:

All these rituals of the slave market excite me greatly. The light is ugly, the music gets on my nerves, the shows are sinister, and one could consider that such a spectacle, dreadful from a moral standpoint, is also repulsive and vulgar. But it pleases me beyond reason. The abundance of very attractive boys, immediately available, puts me in a state of desire that I no longer need to curb or conceal. Money and sex, I am in the heart of my system, one that finally works for me, because I know I will not be refused… Western morality, the endless guilt and shame that I drag with me, shatters; and the world goes to ruin…

At the time, the book was largely ignored by the public, though literary critics liked it. Dominique Fernandez at the Nouvel Observateur called it “a touching and modest confession… [where] much is allusive and left unsaid.”

Ambiguity may be a terrific literary strategy, but in politics, what you leave unsaid is only fuel for speculation. Mr. Mitterrand has repeatedly denied sleeping with underage prostitutes. But in light of the Sarkozy administration’s ongoing negotiations with the Thai government over ways to combat sexual tourism, his impassioned defense of Polanski struck a dissonant note. “As a minister of culture he has drawn attention to himself by defending a film maker accused of raping a child,” Socialist party spokesman Benoit Hamon told Reuters “and he has written a book where he said he took advantage of sexual tourism. To say the least, I find it shocking.”

On Friday, Sarkozy made an about face and also came out in defense of Polanski—many suspect at the urging of  French first lady Carla Bruni-Sarkozy, who counts Mitterrand as a close friend. However, the president also attempted to draw a line under the Mitterrand affair. “Frédéric Mitterrand has recognized that his declaration was an error and that he regretted it,” said the president, “I couldn’t say it any better.”

Jean Sarkozy. Source Wikimedia.

Next up was Jean Sarkozy, the second son of the head of state. Just 23-years-old, and already he’s been tapped to head EPAD, the development board that oversees the giant office park La Défense, to the west of Paris—the largest of its kind in Europe. “Prince Jean,” as he’s sometimes called, is set to take over the gavel at an organization with an annual budget of €115 million (around $160 million). There is, however, some concern that he may be a tad young for the job, seeing as how he hasn’t quite finished law school. “You have to ask,” former French presidential candidate Segolène Royale said in a radio interview, “If he had a different name, would he be in the place he is today?” One imagines not.

It’s worth noting, in the space of this article alone, already there’ve been three politicians mentioned, who  happen to be related to other famous politicians—Mitterrand, Sarkozy and Le Pen. (Marine Le Pen is the daughter of rightwing demagogue and presidential spoiler Jean Marie Le Pen.)  This is an anomaly.  Dynastic politics are not the norm in France. The French pride themselves on an egalitarian system of education that tracks and cultivates the technocratic politicians who run the state. At the top of the system, the École Nationale d’Administration (ENA) takes the elite of the already selective grandes écoles, and prepares them for government service. ENA graduates, or enarques, inhabit the top levels of government and business in France, and include two of the last four presidents. “Many French will tell you that the good state should be run by the best qualified technicians,” historian Gil Mihaely tells the Faster Times. The classic political career in France, unlike in the United States, is not to be a lawyer or businessman, but to go through the state apparatus. “French people don’t understand how someone can run a very complicated organization without having the requisite diplomas,” he explains.

Of course, in practice, the system is not nearly as egalitarian as advertised.  Education may be the great leveler in France, but just like the American Ivy League, the children from the upper middle class and higher hold a disproportionate share of places at France’s elite schools.  The grandes écoles, in turn, take a disproportionate share of state money. (Meanwhile, kids at the bottom rung can hope for soccer tickets.) And what makes this educational inequality all the more insidious is that the tracking, which begins at school, continues throughout a career. Believe it or not, it’s not enough to graduate from ENA; even a student’s ranking, out of the tiny elite graduating class of around a hundred, can affect his or her chances later in life. It all adds up to a system that strongly favors and perpetuates the status quo.

In recent years, French politics have grown increasingly populist, and it’s become common for politicians to bash ENA and the technocratic elite it’s come to represent. While pursuing the presidency, Sarkozy made a lot of hay out of the fact that he was a lawyer and not an enarque, unlike his rival, Segolène Royale. In truth, many establishment figures did find Sarkozy’s self-made image threatening. And now, to a certain extent, by entering politics early and seeking a law degree in lieu of something more prestigious, Sarkozy the younger is simply following in daddy’s footsteps.

La Défense. Photo by Max London

Except, his path has been seriously greased. “My personal opinion is that, although what they’re doing is legal, it should fall under the category ‘things that are just not done,’” admits Mr. Mihaely. “It’s looking more and more like he’s being anointed.”

Like his father, Jean Sarkozy was elected to the city council in the tony suburb of Neuilly-sur-seine at the tender age of 22.  Young Nicolas spent the next six years on the council working as a party organizer for the center right. He was running the reelection campaign when the mayor suddenly died of a heart attack. Sarko’s mentor, Charles Pasqua, was the heir presumptive, but he happened to be temporarily hospitalized, and so Sarko seized the opportunity and won the election.

Jean, by contrast, ran unopposed for his seat on the suburban city council, in a neighborhood where his dad won 85% of the presidential vote. Three months later, Prince Jean’s colleagues on the council elected him council president, and the following year, the same colleagues nominated him to run EPAD.  This is egregious enough, but from a public relations standpoint, the Sarkozy dynasty has only made things worse by acting oblivious and entitled. The president has argued that his son is being unfairly targeted by the media, and he has mustered his entire political machine to defend him. This morning’s right-leaning Figaro website ran a story titled, “La Défense Needs Jean Sarkozy’s Dynamism,” which is a pretty bald euphemism for callow youth and blatant inexperience.

Now the polls are showing what privately members of the ruling party confirm: the scandals of the last two weeks have severely undercut the president’s political support. A CSA/Le Parisien poll last week found 51% of his supporters viewed Jean Sarkozy’s promotion as “a bad thing.” 62% said they still favored Sarko’s continuing support for Frédéric Mitterand; that compares to 40% of voters overall.

The irony of it all is that much of this probably could have been avoided if Jean Sarkozy had just stayed in school a little longer. The children of elites getting handed the levers of power—so long as they’ve got the right educational pedigree—that’s not nepotism; that’s just business as usual in France.

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