For the unmanned military systems often referred to as “drones” or “robots” the future is now. Today there are around 50 countries investing in the research, development and purchase of unmanned systems in order to add them to the fabric of their armed forces. The utility of unmanned systems has become readily apparent to military commanders during this era of irregular warfare, with their usage spreading to operational theaters as diverse as Afghanistan, Gaza, Georgia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sudan and Yemen.

Among the heaviest investors in unmanned platforms are the U.S. and Israel - two countries that have engaged in difficult theaters where intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance have proven invaluable for troops on the ground.

Though it had only a smattering of unmanned aerial drones on the eve of the Iraq invasion in 2003, today the U.S. has nearly 7,000 aerial drones in its military inventory, plus another 12,000 ground robots. Israeli industry is developing some 40 different unmanned aerial systems and Ministry of Defense labs are exploring innovative concepts for ground systems.

The most famous unmanned system currently in American service is the Air Forces’ MQ-1 Predator Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which is primarily utilized for surveillance but can also be outfitted with laser-guided missiles such as the AGM-114 Hellfire for use in targeted air strikes.

The Predator and its newer and larger relation, the MQ-9 Reaper, have seen increasing usage in the Afghan and Pakistan theaters, which in turn has elicited debate in the intelligence community as to the practicality of drone attacks in counterinsurgency operations. While no one disputes the value of these UAVs in providing useful intelligence to ground troops via video feeds, questions have been raised as to whether such air strikes create a negative perception of U.S. tactics amongst civilian populations, therefore helping fuel the very insurgencies American forces hope to quell.

This discussion aside, the U.S. Air Force has come to accept that UAVs are a crucial tool for modern combat operations. Evidence of the service’s transformation became apparent in 2009 when it trained more pilots for operating unmanned aerial systems than for manned fighter and bomber aircraft. Under its 30-year “Aircraft Investment Plan” the Air Force is planning on the $820 million purchase of 372 MQ-9 Reapers during the period between 2011 and 2018, plus some 60-odd RQ-4 Global Hawks. Overall, from 2008 through 2013 the Pentagon expects to invest more than $16 billion on the development and purchase of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

For their part, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have been utilizing UAVs in combat since 1982 when they first used them against Syrian air defenses in Lebanon. Faced with a complex operational environment involving a blend of urban combat and guerilla warfare, the Israelis have invested heavily in unmanned platforms and as a result are considered pioneers in the field. Led by Elbit Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the Israeli defense industry has witnessed its UAV exports explode in the past decade, with clients such as Georgia, India, Poland, Turkey, and even Russia scrambling to get their hands on the platforms.

But it is for the purpose of outfitting their own forces that Israeli industry places its greatest emphasis on developing unmanned systems. The Israel Air Force recently declared its Heron TP high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAV (referred to as “Eitan” in Israeli service) to be operational. The 5-ton Eitan is capable of operating above 40,000 feet and remaining airborne for 24- to 36-hour periods. It will serve as one of the principal platforms in the Israel Air Force’ UAV squadrons, along with the mid-size, long-endurance Hermes 450 (”Zik”) and the Heron-1 (”Shoval”).

In addition, Israeli ground forces battalions will be receiving 100 Skylark 1 LE mini-UAVs produced by domestic manufacturer Elbit Systems under a $40 million contract extended by the Israeli Ministry of Defence under its “Sky Raider” program. The Skylark mini-UAVs have also been procured by countries such as Australia, Canada, France and Sweden.

Not content simply with unmanned aerial systems, the Israelis are increasingly utilizing unmanned ground systems such as the Guardium ground vehicle and the “Dawn Thunder” Caterpillar D9 bulldozer for operations in mine-laden areas and clearing improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

While the Israelis forge ahead in terms of land-based unmanned alternatives, the U.S. and U.K. are the leaders in the research and development of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Both countries are putting more and more emphasis on UUVs for harbor surveillance, submarine detection and mine-clearance purposes.

The boon in development, procurement and usage of unmanned systems is a reflection of their practicality within the battle-space. For instance, unmanned aerial systems serve as an effective force multiplier, enhancing the stand-off attack capabilities of the forces who wield them while also providing “over the hill” surveillance and real-time intelligence feeds. These systems also reduce the risk of friendly casualties, be they pilots in the air or soldiers on the ground. Unmanned aerial drones can loiter in the air longer than jet aircraft which rely upon the physical endurance of the fighter pilot. Finally, UAVs are a cost-effective alternative to expensive combat aircraft - though for now they remain a supplement to, and not a replacement for, jet fighters.

But with the positive factors also come negatives. These include the vulnerability of UAVs to signal-jamming, video feed hacking, and integrated air-defenses. The latter is of particular importance as American and Israeli drone operations have yet to confront robust air-defense networks where their UAVs lack of countermeasures renders them defenseless against enemy fire. There are also ethical concerns involving the use of unmanned systems. Governments may be led to believe that their use in the stand-off attack role shields them from public opprobrium since their own soldiers’ lives are not directly placed at risk. This in turn might lead to more liberalized use of drone strikes under the false assumption that these attacks carry with them few adverse consequences, such as unintended civilian casualties.

Despite these negatives, the pursuit of unmanned military systems from all corners has gone from a trickle to a flood. Most ominously, non-state actors have gotten into the game as illustrated by Hezbollah’s use of Iranian-made Mirsad-1 UAVs to penetrate Israeli airspace. Through the experience of their own operations in Afghanistan, NATO members have recognized the benefit of unmanned systems and have scrambled to outfit their deployable forces with them. Russia, too, has learned from battlefield experience, and after its brief war with Georgia in August 2008 the Russian military purchased 12 Israeli systems and is seeking a further 100 UAVs.

While the U.S. and Israel have been at the forefront of unmanned warfare so far, the gap between the haves and the have nots is shrinking. As that gap shrinks what was heralded only a few years ago as the wave of the future in military operations has suddenly become a practical tool for the wars of today.

Photo by The U.S. Army.

While Argentina still considers the islands their own and the defeat at the hands of the British a stain on the national memory, the current spat is less about Falkland sovereignty than about oil rights and domestic politics - particularly the latter. British company Desire Petroleum began drilling for oil and gas in the North Falkland Basin on February 22, the culmination of a build-up weeks in the making. Argentina had asked British authorities to refrain from drilling on territory it considers its own and that any such activity would breach a United Nations resolution barring unilateral development in disputed waters. The British government however insists that such oil exploration complies with international law.

With an estimated 60 billions barrels worth of oil in the ocean floor shelf north of the Falkland Islands, tensions over control of such a lucrative resource seem only natural. But for Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, they represent an opportunity to divert public attention from the country’s domestic problems and galvanize support for her unpopular administration by rallying the public around an emotionally-laden issue.

Kirchner, who first announced on February 16 that ships traveling from Argentina to the islands would need to obtain permission from Buenos Aires, has unleashed a diplomatic offensive, securing support for her country’s position from 33 nations in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as making an appeal to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. Though Buenos Aires has been careful to emphasize that it does not seek another war, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has stated that the U.K. will defend the islands.

The present situation strikes some as eerily similar to that of 1982, when the ruling military junta in Buenos Aires under President Leopoldo Galtieri - who much like Kirchner today was facing his own domestic problems - authorized the invasion of the islands, leading to the Argentine capture of Port Stanley.

Some argue that the current debate in the U.K. over cutting expensive defense programs, such as one for two 65,000-ton Queen Elizabeth aircraft carriers, is reflective of the environment in 1982 when the withdrawal of HMS Endurance was perceived by Buenos Aires as a sign of British weakness, opening the door for the ruling junta to seize the islands. Others point out that if Galtieri had waited a mere six months longer before launching the invasion, the defence review undertaken by the British government of Margaret Thatcher - which emphasized cutting the defense budget as part of a greater effort to slash public expenditures - might have made it impossible for the U.K. to retake the islands.

Such particulars aside, it should be emphasized that the Falkland Islands are better defended today than they were prior to the 1982 Argentine invasion. And while today’s Royal Navy and British Army (many of whose elite troops are currently deployed to Afghanistan) would inarguably have great difficulty in assembling another task force to retake the islands, with seven amphibious warfare ships in Royal Navy service there remains sufficient capability to relieve the islands in case of a military stalemate despite a minimal supply of escort ships.

The crucial question is less what the British could muster should war again break out, but whether Argentina could mount another such invasion. With the HMS Clyde patrol ship and Type 42 HMS Gloucester frigate both patrolling Falkland waters and the Type 42 HMS York reportedly deployed to the area as well, a robust Royal Navy component is patrolling the area. The British also have four modern-generation Eurofighter Typhoons based at Mount Pleasant air base and 1,076 military personnel stationed on the islands.

In contrast, the Argentine armed forces offer up little offensive capability. Once a formidable service, the Argentine Air Force today comprises an aging combination of A-4 Skyhawk and Mirage attack fighters, while the Navy can muster a few Super Entendard strike aircraft and six P-3B Orions. In terms of surface combatants the Argentine Navy has four destroyers that are each nearly thirty years old, and nine frigates only two of which were commissioned after 1990. More importantly, Argentina has retired its only landing craft (the Cabo San Antonio) and no longer has an aircraft carrier, so despite its proximity to the Falklands (300 miles) it would be a difficult hurdle for the country to forcefully retake the islands.

Simply looking at the most recent defense expenditures - $2.2 billion in 2009 for Argentina versus $60+ billion for the U.K. - reveals the discrepancy in training, manpower and equipment commitment provided each nation’s armed forces by their respective governments. That the British armed forces have suffered from years of conducting overseas operations on peacetime budgets is of little dispute. But despite their stretched capabilities and the logistical challenge of reinforcing an island group in the South Atlantic that lay 8,000 miles from their home base, if war were to break out they could still bring more modern capability to bear than their Argentine counterpart.

One aside to the territorial dispute is that the big winner amidst all the public posturing between Buenos Aires and London may prove to be the British Royal Navy. As recently as a month ago the service was bracing itself for program cuts believed to be all but inevitable under the looming Strategic Defense Review. Supporters of maintaining a robust, full-spectrum British defense component are using recent events to lament what they describe as “a state of decay” in the British armed forces, lambasting the Labor government’s defense policies in the process.

While the Falkland territorial dispute will continue to retain its political dimension, the possibility that another war erupts would more likely be the result of an incidental trigger - Argentine warships halting British oil ships, for instance - than another planned invasion of the islands by Buenos Aires. Keeping the fire lit on the issue may provide Ms. Kirchner with a boost heading into the 2011 presidential election, but advocating open warfare to resolve her country’s claim to the island serves no one, least of all Argentina.

With Buenos Aires’ diplomatic envoys going into overdrive to downplay the prospect of war over the islands, the Argentine president no doubt understands this, much as she probably grasps that another such war might very well end for Buenos Aires in the same manner as the last affair - with its armed forces defeated and the sitting government given the boot by an angry public.

Photo by Tim Pearce, Los Gatos.

This step presents a challenge for the U.S. armed forces as it embraces the concept of ‘network-centric’ warfare, loosely defined as a shared awareness of the battle-space amongst both commanders and soldiers through a linked information network. This ability to share timely and accurate information ideally allows for faster response times, an increased tempo of operations, lower casualties, and the improved lethality of the soldier in the field. Such core capabilities of network-centric warfare as C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) enable armed forces to utilize technology as a means to offset the need for mass on the battlefield.

However, a military dependence on network-centric warfare creates vulnerabilities for tech-savvy foes to exploit. Therefore cyber-security - which includes the use of firewalls and top secret data encryption - is of paramount importance to the U.S. Department of Defense. Pentagon expenditures on cyber-security are estimated to be at least $100 million and that level of investment should rise in the coming years under the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Cyber threats emanate from a variety of actors, including states, terrorist organizations and criminals. Infiltration and attacks on government servers and computer networks are referred to as ‘cyberwarfare’ and are an important tool in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) asymmetric toolkit. The PLA has long recognized that employing waves of hackers and attacking U.S. computer-dependent infrastructure provides an effective means to counter the sizable U.S. edge in technology. This fits into the philosophy of senior PLA officers, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, who outlined their ideas in the book “Unrestricted Warfare” which examined ways through which to defeat a technologically superior foe such as the U.S.

Cyberwarfare itself is hardly a new concept, with Russia’s massed cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008 - as well as China’s recent incident with Google - serving as public notice that it is not just the rogue hacker but nation-states as well which will seize the information superhighway as a spearhead to disrupt or gather information on a real or perceived enemy. Starting in 2003, Chinese hackers unleashed a wave of attacks on U.S. government servers referred to as Titan Rain. These attacks are believed to have led to Chinese pilfering of valuable intelligence from NASA, the Redstone Arsenal, defense industrial giant Lockheed Martin, and a variety of other sources.

The U.S. Department of Defense network structure is reported to be constantly subjected to probes by a multitude of Chinese hackers hoping to overwhelm the system. Disruption of U.S. systems in time of war - principally a short Chinese offensive against Taiwan in which U.S. response time would be delayed - and the narrowing of the technological divide between the two countries are the primary goals of the PLA. Such activity also provides th PLA with an offensive reach extending into the heart of the U.S. at very little nominal cost.

For the perpetrators, the beauty of cyberwarfare is not just the favorable cost-versus-benefits ration, but the inability of the victim to provide solid proof of their involvement. Because cyberwarfare occurs in an unregulated battle-space and tracing attacks back to the original source remains so elusive, as the Chinese have shown, states can hide behind ‘rogue’ hackers and utilize massed attacks on networks.

From PLA employment of “cyber militia units” and the activities of private “patriotic hackers”, China has no shortage of persons working to gather U.S. intelligence or plant dormant bugs. The use of computer hackers not directly serving in the PLA provides China with plausible deniability when approached by government officials from countries subjected to Chinese cyber attacks.

As a response, the Pentagon has launched an initiative through its agency, DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), referred to as the “Cyber Genome” project. This project hopes to utilize digital residue as a means to trace a cyber-attack back to its originator. In other words, DARPA hopes to digitally parallel police DNA forensics in order to accurately identify the transgressing party.

The threat of cyberwarfare extends not only to the area of military command-and-control, but can reach further into power grids, domestic communications networks, food and water supply, etc. This creates the opportunity for the attacker to effectively side-step their adversaries’ conventional defenses and sow dissension amongst its population - in the process meeting the dictum of ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu that breaking an enemy’s resistance before actually engaging in combat is the true measure of military excellence.

Across the last decade it has become ever more clear to Pentagon officials that the widespread use of the internet has unleashed a new battlefield upon which adversaries compete - one which will only become more intense in the future. Recognizing that others such as China and Russia - as well as terror organizations - are unwilling to readily cede the battlefield, the U.S. is setting up a cyber-warfare command (USCYBERCOM) and Lockheed Martin has opened its NexGen Cyber Innovation and Technology Center.

There is little doubt that in the Information Age control of cyberspace - for both offensive and defensive purposes - presents those who wield its power with a unique advantage. The struggle for that control is but a continuation in the evolution of war, albeit one without the familiar image of tanks, jet fighters and battleships.

Photo by Patrick Hoeslye

These figures represent a sharp turnaround from the difficulties experienced by Russia during the decade following the breakup of the former Soviet Union. Perhaps more importantly, they represent a ray of light for a defense industry viewed by some as teetering on insolvency. The continuing growth in sales of Russian military-related exports serves notice to those predicting Russia’s defense industrial demise that at least for now such prognostications remain premature.

During the Soviet-era the Kremlin had cultivated an enormous military-industrial complex that came to represent between 15-25 percent of the entire Soviet GDP. After the dissolution of the USSR, however, the Soviet-built defense industrial infrastructure began to crumble under its own weight. Some weapons factories were converted for the purpose of producing consumer goods and the industry as a whole suffered from a sharp decline in state orders.

Challenged by the shift from the Soviet-controlled economic system to the rigors of competing in a market economy, the Russian defense sector was left scrambling without the former stream of state funding so vital to keeping technological development and assembly lines humming. Military production facilities and design and research institutes started to fall behind their competitors in the West, while many of the high-skilled engineers and other workers joined the growing Russian exodus abroad, depriving the sector of crucial intellectual capital.

The lack of state orders forced the Russian defense producers to turn to the export market for its source of revenue, but here it also encountered difficulties. The principal recipients of Soviet armaments, former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states, had vanished as an export source upon the collapse of their communist governments.

The demise of the Soviet Union heralded a shift of the strategic axis of Central and Eastern Europe, as the countries in this region sought integration with their Western neighbors. By opting to join NATO these countries committed to ridding themselves of Soviet-legacy hardware in favor of NATO-standard equipment. As a result, Russian defense suppliers became increasingly reliant upon China and India to serve as the engine of their export market, and by the beginning of the 21^st Century those two nations comprised 80 percent of all purchases of Russian military hardware.

Russia’s defense producers also continued to rely on Soviet-legacy designs, which were based on the paradigm of state-on-state industrialized warfare matching Soviet systems against those of the U.S. and NATO. Meanwhile, niche producers such as Israel began to focus on defense products of greater relevance in the area of irregular warfare. An emphasis on defense electronics and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) allowed Israel to become a stronger player in the global arms market, eroding some of the Russian share of the Indian defense market.

Questions concerning the capacity for innovation have also plagued Russia’s defense industry, leading some government officials to criticize the sector for failing to provide the high-tech weaponry needed to outfit the Russian armed forces with modern platforms.  This has forced the Defense Ministry to do what was unthinkable during the post-Second World War Soviet period: turn to outside sources for needed equipment, as exemplified by negotiations for the Russian purchase of Israeli UAVs.

Despite these problems, global demand for its defense products in select areas such as air-defense systems, helicopters, missiles and combat aircraft indicates that the Russian defense industry still exudes life. Former Soviet arms clients such as Algeria, Syria and Vietnam have been tapped, new clients in Malaysia and Venezuela have been cultivated, and the Kremlin has shrewdly used the implied delivery of its S-300 air-defense system to Iran to try and pry more money for the same platform out of the Saudis.

Russian defense products, while perhaps not of the high-tech quality of their Western competitors, continue to be valued on the global market. Russian small arms, in particular, remain in demand due to their functionality, durability, easy maintenance and relatively low cost - each aspect a byproduct of the Soviet-era need to outfit a large, conscript army. Cooperative projects with other countries, such as India on the PAK FA fighter and Brahmos anti-ship missile, may also offer a lifeline for the industry.

More importantly, however, has been the renewed attention placed on the defense sector since Vladimir Putin first came to power. Under his leadership the Russian government streamlined Russia’s defense export business by creating Rosoboronexport as the unitary state arms trader, and then embarked on the nationalization and consolidation of the entirety of Russia’s defense industry. In addition the Kremlin has provided the defense sector with a financial cushion by boosting state orders for military equipment to the tune of $189 billion under the 2007-2015 State Armaments Program, while at the same time launching an effort to root out endemic corruption.

Whether such efforts will lead to a renewed strength in the Russian defense industry or instead temporarily serve to stave off its further diminishment is uncertain. But the looming difficulties facing the Russian defense sector are unlikely to be overcome by an uptick in year-on-year export sales. Foremost among these difficulties is the decline in Chinese demand for Russian hardware. Improved Chinese production capabilities and the country’s growth as an arms exporting competitor are undoubtedly of concern to Moscow.  There has also been a problem regarding the pilfering of Russian defense technologies, where countries produce copies of Russian designs without the purchase of a license, resulting in a loss of revenue.

Unless the Russian defense industry is able to demonstrate advanced innovations or develop new technologies in coordination with outside partners, the likelihood increases that within the next decade some of its particular segments - such as production of naval surface vessels - will be forced to cede their own domestic market to foreign suppliers. While perhaps not the collapse predicted, such a scenario would result in the further shrinking of the Russian defense industry and its relegation to niche provider on the global market.

Photo by Danner Glyde.

The sales of armaments and military-related equipment and support to Taiwan may hinder - temporarily at least - whatever progress made by the administration in pushing for more cooperation between the two countries in areas such as climate change, nuclear proliferation and regional security issues. Perhaps more importantly, it may also lead China to temporarily sever military-to-military contacts with the U.S.

Politically-speaking, for the Obama administration there is no good time to announce the approval of arms sales to Taiwan, only a least-damaging one. The potential sales involved may include 60 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, second-hand Perry-class frigates, design assistance on diesel-electric submarines, an upgrade deal for the “Po Sheng” (Broad Victory) C4I (command, control, communications, computers and military intelligence) system, and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles and upgrades to Taiwan’s existing Patriot missile defense system.

These items - most notably the Patriot missiles - were previously approved by the outgoing Bush administration, many of them in December 2008 under a combined $6.5 billion bundle of defense items. Others date back earlier, to 2001 when the Bush administration first took office and concocted a $17-18 billion arms package for Taiwan. In fact, most, if not all, of these Foreign Military Sales (FMS) proposals were delayed for years by Taipei after first being proposed by the U.S. due to internal political gamesmanship involving the allocations of procurement funding. Thus, what is now being offered up by Washington is merely a reconstituted arms package postdated by almost a full decade.

With the news of the impending approval of sales by the White House come questions as to what value the items involved would be to Taiwan, which is faced with some 1,500 Chinese missiles pointed at their island nation, plus a further 140 People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA Navy) submarine and combat vessels  operating in close proximity. Some argue that a serious U.S. commitment to the island’s defense would entail a significant boost to Taiwan in terms of transfer of weapons capabilities that would allow for a more equitable balance of power between the two opposing sides.

Others make the point that if Taiwan wants to continue the rapprochement with China heralded by the election of President Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, it needs to reject the latest arms offer by Washington and instead focus on final negotiation of the partial free trade agreement (the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) with Beijing. So long as Taiwan retains a robust economy and an American commitment to defend the island, this side argues, then Taipei will have a better deterrent against Chinese aggression than anything provided within the rehashed armaments package put forward by the U.S.

So what motive - other than the obvious ones of profit and job-share for the U.S. defense industry - might lie behind the looming approval of arms sales for Taiwan? In reality, it amounts to little more than posturing by the U.S.

From the perspective of Washington, the proposed sales would allow it to lay claim to providing the means for Taiwan to defend itself from potential invasion by China. Such a move would also represent a symbolic gesture towards curtailing China’s gathering sense of triumphalism, while doing so in the least politically-damaging way. After all, the one item clearly desired by Taiwan - a longstanding request for 66 F-16C/D jet fighters - is not rumored to be under consideration for approval by the U.S., thus rendering any pretense of outrage by the Chinese somewhat hollow.

While displeasure at the U.S. arms proposals will no doubt be levelled by Beijing officials, China can hardly claim to be under threat from such transfers to Taiwan of American weaponry and defense systems. After all, China’s attempt to portray such sales as a hostile act are undercut by its amassing of an array of missiles and defense platforms easily capable of overwhelming whatever military benefit Taiwan may derive from acquiring 200-300 Patriot missiles and PAC-3 fire units. Nor will eight second-hand Perry-class frigates do much for the Taiwanese naval component as these are merely intended as replacements for ageing vessels about to be phased out of service.

For Taiwan, the limitations of the arms package might afford it the opportunity to acquire new weaponry without upsetting the delicate inroads President Ma Ying-jeou has forged with the People’s Republic. The Taiwanese government can point out to Beijing that its defense expenditures represent about one-tenth of what China spends on its military, and that while Beijing has continued to build up the PLA, stockpile missiles and expand its amphibious capabilities, Taipei will cut its defense budget for the second straight year in 2010, bringing it down to $9.3 billion.

However, perception is often greater than reality and China is upset by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan no less than the U.S. is by Chinese sales to North Korea or Iran. After all, the issue for Beijing is a distinctly personal one. At the end of the day, should Taiwan agree to purchase whatever is offered up by Washington via FMS channels, expect the knock-on effect to be a brief downturn in U.S.-China relations perhaps coupled with an effort by Beijing to further expand its cross-channel military capability.

At the time they were unveiled, the proposed arms sales and military-assistance packages were meant to allay concerns among friendly nations that the U.S. would abandon them to the regional designs of Iran.  They were also meant to outfit the countries of the Gulf region as a strategic bulwark against Iran by providing them with superior firepower and military technologies over their Persian rival. Of the recipient nations, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were considered the principal chess pieces in Washington’s regional strategy of countering Iran’s presumed hegemonic aspirations.

The announcement of the arms packages immediately drew criticism from all quarters, with European capitals charging that American actions were simply adding fuel to an already inflamed situation. In an unusual convergence of opinion, both Israel and Iran voiced their displeasure at the significant increase in sales to Saudi Arabia. Israeli unease largely centered on the proposed foreign military sale to the Saudis of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). The JDAM is a guidance kit that is attached to a bomb, in the process converting it into a navigable ’smart weapon’, or more commonly, a precision-guided munition.

While Israel was discomfited by the proposed JDAM sale to the Saudis, it tacitly - if uncomfortably - acknowledged the U.S. strategy and otherwise voiced lesser opposition to the overall arms sales proposal, partially due to recognition of the uneven distribution of U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) skewed in its favor. There was also an unspoken reality involved in the Israeli government’s relative restraint: with the threat of a nuclear Iran hanging over the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia had evolved into de facto allies despite the continuing lack of diplomatic recognition extended to Jerusalem by Riyadh. However uneasy it may have been with their distribution among neighboring countries, Israel was also of the understanding that the bulk of the U.S. arms sales would be largely defensive in nature.

But despite repeated assurances from Washington that Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) over the rest of the region would remain intact (a crucial factor for Washington in determining the approval of U.S. arms sales to the Middle East), the Israeli defense establishment has gradually grown more and more anxious over the tide of U.S. arms sales to the region. This concern hardly abated after the flurry of December announcements by the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) regarding sales of Harpoon Block II anti-ship cruise missiles to Egypt, Javelin anti-tank missiles to Jordan, TOW-2 antitank missiles to Saudi Arabia and an assortment of enhanced guided bombs (including 400 BLU-109/B ‘bunker buster’ bombs) to the UAE.

Yet U.S. arms sales to the region - particularly to Egypt - are hardly a new phenomenon. The U.S. has been the largest arms dealer to the Middle East over recent decades, and from 1981 through 2006 alone it delivered $72 billion worth of armaments, training and military-related services to the six countries comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The U.S. has also been a large supplier of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Egypt since the 1979 signing of its peace treaty with Israel. In fact Egypt is the largest recipient of military aid after Israel, receiving on average $1.3 billion in FMF - all of it gratis. About 30 percent of that annual total is earmarked by the Egyptian military for procurement of U.S. military equipment to replace most of its aging Soviet-legacy hardware. Still, these yearly allotments from Washington are carefully kept at around half of the FMF amount parcelled out to Israel.

Why then the increased alarm in Israel over the FMS proposals to Egypt and the countries of the Gulf? After all, the Pentagon continues to insist in its news release announcements to Congress that its sales will not affect the basic military balance within the Near East region - an important distinction as arms sales viewed as a de-stabilizing influence are prohibited under the 1976 Arms Control Export Act.

There could be numerous reasons, but one may be the current drift of FMS proposals by Washington. Though Israel has not concluded an arms deal with the U.S. since the Obama administration came into office, over the course of 2009 there were thirty announced DSCA proposals for sales of defense material, military-related services and support intended for countries in the region (including Turkey and Iraq).

Perhaps more importantly, some of these FMS proposals might be viewed by the Israeli defense establishment as providing a greater amount of firepower to the recipient countries than it believes necessary. From the Israeli perspective the threat from Iran is twofold: its nuclear and missile programs and its sponsorship of terrorism in the region. Israeli defense officials very likely find it difficult to believe that the Arab nations in the Gulf face an invasion from across the water by Iran, with an Iran-Egypt conventional war an even more implausible possibility.

Though the Pentagon states that these weapons do not tilt the military strategic balance, Israeli officials may fear that this array of weaponry could be turned around on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the future event of an outbreak of conflict between Israel and any of its neighbors. For instance, Javelin anti-tank missiles sold to Jordan or Saudi Arabia might end up being wielded by militants against Israeli Merkava tanks and Namer armored infantry fighting vehicles, much as U.S.-supplied material might eventually see utilization by a post-Mubarak Egyptian regime choosing to break its peace with Israel.

While from the present perspective such scenarios remain extremely unlikely, viewed from the eyes of Israeli defense officials the near-term assumption must also be balanced against the longer-term unknown. The collapse of an Arab regime saddled with advanced U.S. weaponry would create the risk of such armaments falling into the hands of elements hostile to Israel and diametrically opposed to U.S. interests. Such a risk is one Israel, with its small pool of manpower and limited geographical boundaries, can ill afford to take for granted. And it is a scenario not without precedent: the 1979 Iranian Revolution resulted in the newly-minted Islamic Republic inheriting some $17 billion worth of American-produced defense items purchased by the Shah during the 1970s. Such an instance might serve as a reminder to Congress and lend it pause prior to approving certain arms sales to the Middle East.

Calls by NATO Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen for a greater Alliance commitment of troops have been met with piecemeal responses, resulting in about 7,000 additional soldiers - 2,000 of which have been pledged by non-Alliance members Australia, Armenia, Finland, Georgia, Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro, South Korea, Sweden and the Ukraine.

Yet the total number of additional non-U.S. troops being provided by coalition partners is deceiving as some of these forces (around 1,500) have already been stationed in Afghanistan since last summer as part of a collective security boost for the period before and after the Afghan presidential election of August 20. Instead of being withdrawn at the end of the year as originally planned, these troops will instead remain deployed in Afghanistan on a permanent basis and be counted by ISAF as part of the parallel Alliance response to the U.S. ’surge.’

Also dampening the spirit of allied support for Washington’s fresh Afghan initiative is that these extra allied forces have to be weighed against the impending withdrawals of 2,160 Dutch forces in 2010, and 2,830 Canadian troops in 2011. So while 7,000 additional troops are going into theater during 2010, by the end of 2011 almost 5,000 will have come out. Subtract the estimated 1,500 already in-theater that are counted as part of the NATO total and you have a projected net boost of 500 non-U.S. troops between 2010 and 2011.

While that slender total is perhaps sobering enough to Pentagon officials, another figure also stands out: once the additional 30,000 American forces are fully deployed in Afghanistan the U.S. will have 98,000 troops stationed there against less than 45,000 from the combined 43 other countries participating in the ISAF mission. Thus the Alliance effort in Afghanistan increasingly bears an American visage.

This, no doubt, is unsettling for Washington when it considers that Europe has some 2 million combined soldiers in uniform. Yet while NATO members voted to invoke Article 5 of the Alliance treaty in regards to Afghanistan days after 9/11, the issue of troop commitments is more properly viewed through a national - instead of collective - lens. Most Euro-NATO nations are subjected to legal and constitutional restrictions regarding external deployments of troops. As a result, many of the governments of these countries wishing to participate in a multi-national mission must seek parliamentary approval for the deployment of forces abroad.

Other factors also contribute to the difficulty in bolstering the size and scope of the Afghan missions among Euro-NATO partners. With few exceptions most European publics remain dubious of any government sentiment promoting the line that their national security hangs in the balance in Afghanistan, while still others are increasingly uneasy with participation in what they perceive to be an American war.

Unfortunate timing is also an issue. NATO has absorbed twelve new members into its Alliance since 1999, many of whom embarked on modernization efforts early in the decade right as the ISAF mission in Afghanistan first unfolded. Such reforms were launched with the goal of bringing each new respective member’s armed forces up to Alliance standards. The ongoing war in Afghanistan, though providing valuable experience for troops deployed there, has served in part to divert financial resources desperately needed to outfit their armies with modern weaponry and equipment.

These newer NATO members, largely composed of ex-Warsaw Pact states, are not only in need of newer, more sophisticated military technologies to replace their older, Soviet- and Russian-legacy hardware, but now must also repair and replace material utilized in the Afghan theater that has been atrophied or destroyed. Blunting the prospect of this happening in the near-term are the financial realities, including defense budgets that continue to be allocated on a peacetime - not wartime - basis, and reduced government spending necessitated by economic recession and IMF loan requirements.

The requisite political willpower for sustaining an ongoing combat-theater deployment also remains shaky. Some European governments simply do not see an expanded troop presence in a distant country with a longstanding tradition of resistance to outside forces as the tonic for what is ailing the NATO-led ISAF effort. More importantly, the risk of increased costs and casualties stemming from an unpopular campaign in Afghanistan is politically untenable for these governments. Others, such as Greece, are suffering from severe economic circumstances which hinder further involvement.

The Netherlands - which has been one of the NATO partners that has borne the greatest brunt of the Alliance’ mission creep in Afghanistan - is readying to depart. France and Germany both have declared that they will commit no more troops to the Afghan campaign, though there remains the slight possibility they will change their tone following a January 28 conference on Afghanistan in London. While the Afghan campaign is unpopular with the French public, it is even more the case in Germany where political consensus regarding participation within the ISAF mission threatens to crumble.

As for the United Kingdom, the largest contributor to ISAF after the U.S., it has become increasingly vocal concerning the unequal burden-sharing within NATO over the Afghan mission. The ballooning budget deficit is causing British officials of all political stripes to reexamine public expenditures, and with the cost of the U.K. contribution to Afghanistan reaching $14.5 billion since 2001 how much longer the British will be willing to sustain a 10,000-strong force in the Afghan theater comes into question. Helping matters even less has been the near-doubling of British casualties over the course of the past year.

There have been some exceptions among European NATO partners, including recent announcements of additional troop commitments from Italy (1,000), Poland (680) and Spain (500). These deployments will likely mirror the U.S. ’surge’ as described by President Obama on December 1, meaning the extra troops would begin entering the Afghan theater in early 2010 and then draw down in 2011. Otherwise these countries, particularly Italy and Spain where economic recovery has been spotty at best, will strain to continue their deployments.

When President Obama approved 30,000 of the 40,000 additional forces requested by General Stanley McChrystal the idea was that the difference would be made up by Washington’s coalition partners. Some of the commitments it has received from its European partners were perhaps made with the intention of pleasing a new administration that has adopted a different tone than that of its predecessor. Others may have been made out of the belief that Europe must show the U.S. that it is a willing security provider if it hopes for the NATO Alliance to endure. Regardless, the question needed to be asked is just how much longer many European nations intend to remain in Afghanistan.

Photo by isafmedia.

Already the U.S. spends about $3.6 billion per month funding the war in Afghanistan. That figure will soon go appreciably higher. White House estimates place the price tag for the bolstered U.S. deployment at $30 billion, or roughly $1 million per each new soldier deployed into theater. The Pentagon assumes a lower cost at $500,000 per soldier, or an overall $15 billion in additional expenses.

While there has been a general acknowledgment that the new strategy proposal will require a $30-40 billion supplemental spending bill in order to cover the expanded war effort, there is disagreement in Congress over how to pay for the costs. Some members have advocated levying a war tax to fund the additional expenditures, which would involve a progressive taxation initiative rising up to 5 percent for the highest income earners.

More likely, however, the funding will come from additional deficit spending. This was the path routinely opted for under the previous Bush administration during fiscal years 2001- 2008.  Despite a national debt that now has eclipsed $12 trillion, Congress may have little choice but to continue that trend unless it opts to slash government spending elsewhere.

Amidst the funding debate one thing remains a certainty: for the first time since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, spending on the war in Afghanistan will exceed that of Iraq under the fiscal year 2010 Defense Authorization Bill. The Obama administration has sought $65 billion for operations in Afghanistan versus $61 billion for Iraq. The continuing draw-down of troops from the Iraqi theater combined with the redeployment of more forces into Afghanistan is, of course, the most obvious and direct reason for the shift in funding.

Troop totals aside, there is another, more important factor that contributes to the shift in funding costs between the two wars: supply chains.

Simply put, Iraq is a more logistically accessible country than Afghanistan. Though it has only one major port (Umm Qasr), Iraq is not without access to shipping lanes, unlike landlocked Afghanistan. In addition, Iraq sits alongside countries which allowed the U.S. to preposition both personnel and matériel prior to the invasion in 2003. Some of these countries - most prominently Kuwait - continue to allow the U.S. to maintain a forward presence in the region.

Contrastingly, Afghanistan is ringed by countries such as Turkmenistan, Iran and Pakistan, who - if not openly hostile towards a close American presence - have little desire to allow advance U.S. military bases on their soil. Even utilization of a base for the U.S. military at Manas in nearby Kyrgyzstan has been met with difficulties, chiefly due to Russian wariness over the insertion of U.S. forces in its traditional domain.

Iraq also has twice as many airports as Afghanistan, in part due to its agreeable topography. Situated in a remote, mountainous landscape, Afghanistan is limited to only a couple of airfields deemed accessible to military cargo aircraft (the primary one being at Bagram). The lack in Afghanistan of an inland port, sufficient airfield volume and an advanced road network capable of absorbing heavy-lift/wide-body trucks has forced logisticians to seek alternative supply routes.

The primary route originates at the Pakistani port of Karachi, where convoys of supplies debark before proceeding on the 1,250 mile trek to Bagram. This elongated supply line traverses the volatile tribal areas of Pakistan, consequently making it susceptible to disruption.  The necessity of keeping the supply line intact requires the U.S. to pay off local tribes in order to ensure they refrain from raiding the truck convoys and stealing matériel and fuel. Ultimately some of these funds end up in the hands of the Taliban, thus providing funding for the very insurgency the U.S. aims to quell.

While supply lines represent one cost, simply deploying forces into the Afghan theater comes with a hefty price tag. During fiscal year 2009 alone the Pentagon spent $4 billion ferrying troops and equipment into Afghanistan. Once in theater, these troops require fuel for their bases and armored vehicles. According to one analysis each deployed soldier requires 8,000 gallons of fuel per year. U.S. Marines operating in southern Afghanistan are estimated to go through 88,000 gallons of military-grade fuel per day, the cost of which runs the Marine Corps roughly $400 per gallon once all the expenses of transporting it to remote forward operating bases are tallied.

Finally there is the U.S. strategy, which is in part centered upon generating and nurturing an indigenous Afghan security arm that will be capable of holding the country together once U.S. and coalition forces are withdrawn. This remains a formidable goal, particularly in that the Taliban is believed to pay more than twice the monthly salary of the average Afghan soldier or policeman.

In order to entice recruits and ensure they remain sufficiently motivated, the Afghan government recently announced a significant pay boost for both the army and police. This funding, however, is largely underwritten by the U.S. and its allies. The Afghan government kicks in only a small portion of the estimated $25,000 per year it costs to train and outfit an Afghan soldier. General David Petraeus has estimated the cost of creating the 400,000-strong Afghan security forces may exceed $10 billion per year, while Afghan President Hamid Karzai has advised Defense Secretary Robert Gates that it will not be until 2024 that his government will be able to fund its own security.

So for the U.S. to underpin an essential part of its long-term strategy it must add another $140-150 billion to the total war cost. And that excludes funding for industrial, agricultural and infrastructure development - also a necessity if the U.S. hopes to cultivate a stable, friendly Afghanistan. To grasp just a slight measure of how much some of this will cost it should be noted that from fiscal year 2007 through FY09 the U.S. provided Afghanistan with over $1 billion annually in economic support, children’s health and anti-narcotics funding from its foreign operations budget.

With all this in mind it is but a foregone conclusion that expenditures relating to the Afghan war will escalate. The undetermined questions remain just how much more it will cost and whether or not in the end success will be forthcoming. These, of course, are questions that have plagued both military commanders and civilian leaders throughout American history.

Yet one needs only to examine the figures provided by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) regarding the cost of the U.S. wars overseas to appreciate the price for engaging in high-intensity combat operations in distant locales. According to the CRS, since the 9/11 terror attacks the total price tag for the formerly-named Global War on Terror reached $944 billion by the end of fiscal year 2009. With the 2010 Defense Authorization factored in those costs rise to $1.08 trillion.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), meanwhile, has estimated that the cost to the U.S. for its overseas contingency operations from 2010 through 2019 will reach $388 billion. That total is reached with the qualification that U.S. troop levels in both the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters have fallen to 30,000 by 2011. Notwithstanding the ambitious troop withdrawal dates circled on the Washington calendar, a scenario where only 30,000 troops remain deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq by 2011 remains unlikely.

While Washington debates how to pay for these additional war expenses, perhaps a more prescient dialogue might extend into whether the burgeoning price tag for the war effort is sustainable at a time the U.S. is allocating $200 billion annually just for servicing the interest on its ever-growing foreign debt.

Photo by Carl Montgomery.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), by 2008 military expenditures in Central America were up 21 percent since 1999, while in South America they had grown by 50 percent over the same period. The U.K.-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) claims that from 2003 through 2008 total defense spending for Latin America and the Caribbean grew by 91 percent. Others note that since 2003 weapons sales to the region have more than doubled, while overall military spending rose by 30 percent from 2007 to 2008 alone.

As is the case with most regions experiencing growth in military expenditures, multiple factors are steering the Latin American arms market. Some of the increase in defense outlays is economically-driven, largely pertaining to the rise in commodity prices that boosted profits in countries such as Brazil, Chile and Venezuela.

Chile, in particular, ties profits from its principal commodity - copper - to defense investment. Under a military expenditures law introduced in 1958, ten percent of the revenues derived from the country’s copper exports are funneled directly to the Chilean military for purchases of defense matériel. The quadrupling of copper prices earlier in the decade provided Chile with ample cash reserves through which to fund past purchases of F-16 jet fighters, Scorpene attack submarines and four second-hand Dutch naval frigates, along with recent ones of U.S.-produced Avenger fire units, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and Sentinel radar systems.

Another factor concerns regional security dynamics, both internal and external. Colombia, for instance, has been waging an ongoing anti-guerrilla campaign against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) rebels for decades. Bogota’s closeness in relations with the United States - reflected in the nearly $500 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) extended to Colombia by Washington from 2003 through 2009 - and geography with Venezuela also account for its higher defense investment relative to many of its neighbors. From 2007 through 2008, Colombia’s defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP (5.7 percent) exceeded those of the three other largest regional defense spenders - Brazil, Chile and Venezuela.

Modernization of aging military inventories also serves as a catalyst for larger defense investment. Latin America’s principal ascendant nation, Brazil, is undertaking a major arms procurement initiative. While this is being done partly out of the need to modernize its current hardware, it also a natural byproduct of Brazil’s rising global status.

As one of the BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) nations carving a niche for itself on the global stage, Brazil is intent on building up its military component as a means to augment its foreign policy. The Brazilian government has claimed that in order to protect its natural resources it must strengthen its military deterrent. This approach has led to investments that include five Scorpene submarines, 250 German Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks, 50 EC725 transport helicopters, the development of a new family of armored vehicles (Urutu III) and the possible purchase of 50 EADS-CASA C-212 transport aircraft.

The crown jewel in Brazil’s defense modernization effort, however, is the F-X2 new-generation jet fighter competition, involving the Dassault Rafale, the Saab Gripen and the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. An initial $2.2 billion purchase of 36 fighters may lead to an eventual $7+ billion acquisition of 120-150 total aircraft.

The country whose military matériel build-up seems to be causing the most worry in the region is Venezuela. Under its president, Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has used its energy revenues to steadily add to its military arsenal. Chavez has looked to Russia as his primary source for weaponry, spending some $5 billion in recent years on 24 Sukhoi fighter jets, T-92 tanks, an S-300 air-defense system replete with anti-aircraft missiles, 51 military helicopters, and around 100,000 AK-103 assault rifles. Though Chavez has cited worries over U.S. intentions towards his country to justify such purchases, he has also ordered the Venezuelan armed forces to prepare for potential military action against Colombia and been questioned as to why Swedish-produced anti-tank weaponry sold to Venezuela in the 1980s has ended up in the hands of FARC rebels.

Not all Latin American nations are embracing the wave of arms purchases cascading over the region. Smaller nations, such as Ecuador and Peru, have expressed worries about the current trend toward lavish weapons outlays and questioned whether or not an arms race is underway. Paraguay and Uruguay continue to spend little on new weaponry while Argentina keeps its annual defense expenditures low relative to its size and wealth. In total, only three countries - Brazil, Chile and Venezuela - account for 80 percent of all defense acquisitions regionally.

Still, there remains alarm at the expansive sweep in arms purchases being made in a region that has experienced few costly state-on-state wars since the 1940s. But while those observers fret over what they see as a regional arms race, arms-supplying nations prefer to view the increase in military investment as a low-risk/high-reward market opportunity. Several defense exporters - particularly France, China and Russia - instead see a marketplace not entirely beholden to U.S. producers.

Divergent viewpoints notwithstanding, the question remains: Is Latin America engaged in an arms race?

Dissected on a case-by-case basis the answer is: perhaps. The current defense spending habits of Venezuela and Colombia certainly seem to mirror those of European nations, Greece and Turkey, whereby each engages in arms procurement largely in anticipation of conflict with the other. Colombia, however, is actively involved in counterinsurgency operations, whereas Venezuelan President Chavez is making a measured attempt to boost his nation’s regional clout while solidifying his hold on power. The military investment habits of Bogota and Caracas are understandably viewed with alarm by neighboring countries, often resulting in reflexive defense purchases of their own.

Yet despite this, many regional nations are simply conducting a replenishment of their capabilities - a necessary action for maintaining a modern military. Latin America still ranks behind the U.S., China, Europe, the Middle East and the rest of Asia in defense spending and on a regional basis out-spends only Africa, the world’s poorest per-capita continent. However, an outbreak of inter-state conflict would serve to alter the equation completely. Thus the heightened pitch from those voices dreading where muscular displays of newly-acquired armaments may lead.

Seeking to maximize the media value of the incident, the Israeli Foreign Ministry invited diplomatic representatives to view the array of weaponry displayed at the Ashdod port. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) quickly released video footage of both the interception operation and the arms haul itself.

Such a high-profile Israeli interdiction of Iranian arms shipments is not without precedent. Back in 2002, Israel claimed that Iran was behind the shipment of 40-50 tons worth of weaponry seized by the Israeli Navy from the Karine A. The Israelis claimed the arms were intended for Palestinians engaging in the Second Intifada. But the 500-ton haul seized from the Francop greatly eclipses that of the Karine A.

Israel has been intent on proving, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that Iran continues to be in violation of U.N. Resolution 1701, which ended the 34-day Second Lebanon War in 2006. The resolution prohibits the delivery of arms or arms-related equipment into Lebanon and was written specifically with Hezbollah in mind. Additionally, Israel is keen to make the international community aware that Iran also is in breach of U.N. Resolution 1747, which bans Iran from selling or delivering arms to outside actors. The latter resolution is of particular importance to Israel as it was drawn up with Iran’s nascent nuclear program in mind.

The drama surrounding the interdiction of the Francop is indicative of the larger contest played out between Israel and Iran beneath the public’s radar - one that has only intensified as the development clock for Iran’s nuclear program continues to tick. Wary of potential Israeli strikes against its nuclear or military infrastructure, Iran seeks a balance against Israel’s qualitative defense-technological edge.

Lacking the conventional means to apply military pressure on Israel, Iran must seek alternative ways to project power beyond its borders. Militant groups operating on Israel’s periphery - primarily Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon - offer Iran ideal proxy elements through which to squeeze the Israelis and force the IDF to apply resources to contain their activities.

Though Hezbollah acts independently, it is widely recognized that it receives arms, training and funding from Iran and is therefore influenced by Tehran. Hamas, too, is believed to receive much of its weaponry from Iran according to Israeli officials, including rockets capable of striking at distances of 60km, far enough to hit the Israeli city of Tel Aviv.

Because of Israel’s and the international community’s vigilance in blocking the flow illicit armaments into Gaza and Lebanon, the Iranians have had to seek alternate routes and more creative ways through which to channel its military cargo into end-user hands. Whether by sea, air or land, Iran can flood the region with arms knowing that even if some shipments are intercepted, others will ultimately reach their destination. Indeed, according to reports, since the end of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Hezbollah continues to replenish and increase its stocks of missiles and rockets and is ramping up for another round of fighting with the IDF in the event Israel launches a pre-emptive strike on Iran.

Though the weaponry found on board the Francop - 2,800 107mm and 127mm rockets, 9,000 mortars, 20,000 fragmentation grenades and various ammunition-types - represents about only 10 percent of Hezbollah’s current stocks according to the IDF and therefore does little to offset the Israeli advantage in modern firepower and armor, the group does not place particular emphasis upon conventional military tactics, relying instead upon asymmetrical means and hit-and-run guerrilla attacks. While not able to provide much in the way of advanced military platforms, Iran’s defense industry is quite capable of churning out such small arms and ordnance under its Defense Industries Organization umbrella and is known to produce a wide variety of missiles, mostly Iranian versions of Russian, Chinese and North Korean types.

It is this very threat of rocket and missile bombardment that worries Israeli government officials, who have to answer to the public for civilian casualties resulting from such attacks. Because of the risks to Israel of rocket and missile attacks emanating from as near as Gaza and southern Lebanon or as far as Syria or Iran, the IDF has responded by developing a multilayered, modern air-defense network.

The Israeli approach focuses on five separate ‘tiers’, or rings, each designed to protect against missiles and rockets striking from various distances. The U.S. has aided Israel in its missile-defense efforts by providing it with one of its TPY-2 forward-based X-band transportable (FBX-T) ballistic missile detection and tracking radars and has also allocated around $177 million in 2009 funding for programs such as the Arrow-3 missile defense program (the outermost rung in the air-defense network) and David’s Sling.

But to some observers, of greater concern than the flow of Iranian weapons has been the suspect timing of the Francop interdiction. The weapons haul uncovered by the Israelis occurs at a moment the U.S. administration is trying to heighten diplomatic engagement with Iran. A public reminder that Tehran cannot be trusted does little to aid such efforts. It should be noted that the instance concerning the Karine A also collided with U.S.-Iranian efforts to work closer behind the scenes in support of the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom endeavor in Afghanistan. This initial level of U.S.-Iran engagement was in part undone by the incident. Critics of Israeli policy point to parallels between the Francop and Karine A episodes.

But the fact is the U.S. has agreed with the Israeli version of events surrounding the Francop. Earlier in the year, the U.S. Navy stopped a Cypriot-flagged ship, the Monchegorsk, in the Red Sea, which had been chartered by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines. Weaponry, including mortars and artillery shells, was found on board the Syrian-bound ship - weaponry the U.S. believed was being delivered to Hamas. Also, in late October, UNIFIL peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon uncovered Katyusha rockets of make similar to those seized on the Francop. The Katyusha (BM-21) has been a staple weapon of both Hamas and Hezbollah, and though often described as inaccurate, is effectively used by both groups to target Israeli population centers and terrorize its citizenry.

Despite Israel’s success in stopping the Francop shipment, it remains just one incident in an ongoing struggle between two foes. Iran, Hezbollah and Syria each rebuffed Israeli charges concerning their involvement. Public denials notwithstanding, Israel is not about to stop intercepting Iranian cargo it suspects of being delivered to Hamas and Hezbollah. As recently as nine months ago, the Israeli Air Force wiped out a weapons convoy in Sudan that it claimed was destined for Egypt and ultimately into the hands of Hamas (several Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps members were believed to be among the victims). The Iranians may change their routes and techniques, but they should expect similar IDF efforts to foil any future smuggling attempts.