Amidst its preoccupation over the Iranian nuclear program and the more immediate threat of militant groups situated on its periphery, a new source of angst has crept into the Israeli security consciousness. This latest worry has to do with the acquisition of modern U.S. defense equipment by its regional neighbors, the vast bulk of which is part of a massive arms sale boost to Washington’s Middle East allies by the former Bush administration. This bundle of sales was first announced in 2007, and included 10-year military assistance packages of $30 billion for Israel and $13 billion for Egypt, as well as an assortment of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) proposals worth roughly $20 billion to be spread among the Gulf nations of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan and Qatar.

At the time they were unveiled, the proposed arms sales and military-assistance packages were meant to allay concerns among friendly nations that the U.S. would abandon them to the regional designs of Iran.  They were also meant to outfit the countries of the Gulf region as a strategic bulwark against Iran by providing them with superior firepower and military technologies over their Persian rival. Of the recipient nations, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were considered the principal chess pieces in Washington’s regional strategy of countering Iran’s presumed hegemonic aspirations.

The announcement of the arms packages immediately drew criticism from all quarters, with European capitals charging that American actions were simply adding fuel to an already inflamed situation. In an unusual convergence of opinion, both Israel and Iran voiced their displeasure at the significant increase in sales to Saudi Arabia. Israeli unease largely centered on the proposed foreign military sale to the Saudis of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). The JDAM is a guidance kit that is attached to a bomb, in the process converting it into a navigable ’smart weapon’, or more commonly, a precision-guided munition.

While Israel was discomfited by the proposed JDAM sale to the Saudis, it tacitly - if uncomfortably - acknowledged the U.S. strategy and otherwise voiced lesser opposition to the overall arms sales proposal, partially due to recognition of the uneven distribution of U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) skewed in its favor. There was also an unspoken reality involved in the Israeli government’s relative restraint: with the threat of a nuclear Iran hanging over the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia had evolved into de facto allies despite the continuing lack of diplomatic recognition extended to Jerusalem by Riyadh. However uneasy it may have been with their distribution among neighboring countries, Israel was also of the understanding that the bulk of the U.S. arms sales would be largely defensive in nature.

But despite repeated assurances from Washington that Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) over the rest of the region would remain intact (a crucial factor for Washington in determining the approval of U.S. arms sales to the Middle East), the Israeli defense establishment has gradually grown more and more anxious over the tide of U.S. arms sales to the region. This concern hardly abated after the flurry of December announcements by the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) regarding sales of Harpoon Block II anti-ship cruise missiles to Egypt, Javelin anti-tank missiles to Jordan, TOW-2 antitank missiles to Saudi Arabia and an assortment of enhanced guided bombs (including 400 BLU-109/B ‘bunker buster’ bombs) to the UAE.

Yet U.S. arms sales to the region - particularly to Egypt - are hardly a new phenomenon. The U.S. has been the largest arms dealer to the Middle East over recent decades, and from 1981 through 2006 alone it delivered $72 billion worth of armaments, training and military-related services to the six countries comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The U.S. has also been a large supplier of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Egypt since the 1979 signing of its peace treaty with Israel. In fact Egypt is the largest recipient of military aid after Israel, receiving on average $1.3 billion in FMF - all of it gratis. About 30 percent of that annual total is earmarked by the Egyptian military for procurement of U.S. military equipment to replace most of its aging Soviet-legacy hardware. Still, these yearly allotments from Washington are carefully kept at around half of the FMF amount parcelled out to Israel.

Why then the increased alarm in Israel over the FMS proposals to Egypt and the countries of the Gulf? After all, the Pentagon continues to insist in its news release announcements to Congress that its sales will not affect the basic military balance within the Near East region - an important distinction as arms sales viewed as a de-stabilizing influence are prohibited under the 1976 Arms Control Export Act.

There could be numerous reasons, but one may be the current drift of FMS proposals by Washington. Though Israel has not concluded an arms deal with the U.S. since the Obama administration came into office, over the course of 2009 there were thirty announced DSCA proposals for sales of defense material, military-related services and support intended for countries in the region (including Turkey and Iraq).

Perhaps more importantly, some of these FMS proposals might be viewed by the Israeli defense establishment as providing a greater amount of firepower to the recipient countries than it believes necessary. From the Israeli perspective the threat from Iran is twofold: its nuclear and missile programs and its sponsorship of terrorism in the region. Israeli defense officials very likely find it difficult to believe that the Arab nations in the Gulf face an invasion from across the water by Iran, with an Iran-Egypt conventional war an even more implausible possibility.

Though the Pentagon states that these weapons do not tilt the military strategic balance, Israeli officials may fear that this array of weaponry could be turned around on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the future event of an outbreak of conflict between Israel and any of its neighbors. For instance, Javelin anti-tank missiles sold to Jordan or Saudi Arabia might end up being wielded by militants against Israeli Merkava tanks and Namer armored infantry fighting vehicles, much as U.S.-supplied material might eventually see utilization by a post-Mubarak Egyptian regime choosing to break its peace with Israel.

While from the present perspective such scenarios remain extremely unlikely, viewed from the eyes of Israeli defense officials the near-term assumption must also be balanced against the longer-term unknown. The collapse of an Arab regime saddled with advanced U.S. weaponry would create the risk of such armaments falling into the hands of elements hostile to Israel and diametrically opposed to U.S. interests. Such a risk is one Israel, with its small pool of manpower and limited geographical boundaries, can ill afford to take for granted. And it is a scenario not without precedent: the 1979 Iranian Revolution resulted in the newly-minted Islamic Republic inheriting some $17 billion worth of American-produced defense items purchased by the Shah during the 1970s. Such an instance might serve as a reminder to Congress and lend it pause prior to approving certain arms sales to the Middle East.