Much to the consternation of both its regional neighbors and Pentagon officials, China has embarked on a military modernization program that has pushed its official defense budget up to the rank of second-highest in the world behind that of the U.S. Many believe the motivation behind China’s steady defense buildup is aimed at extending the nation’s strategic power projection beyond its near-domain further out across the Pacific region. As China is landlocked on three sides - with Russia to its north, India to its southwest and its western fringes ringed by some of the world’s highest mountain ranges - keeping sea lines open to Chinese shipping remains vital for maintaining the crucial imports of energy and raw materials that serve to fuel its burgeoning economy.

While Beijing remains anchored to the goal of bringing the island of Taiwan - of which China claims sovereignty - under its fold, relations between the two have improved since the election of Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008. Yet in spite of the easing of tensions between Beijing and Taipei and the present global economic difficulties, China’s military buildup of over a decade continues with its official defense budget set to rise 14.9 percent this year to $70.25 billion. This follows a 17.6 percent boost in official defense spending in 2008, and an average increase to the national defense budget of 15.8 percent between 2003 and 2007.

Chinese officials are quick to point out that defense expenditures have rose in accordance with greater governmental revenue intake, a direct result of China’s booming economy. They note that according to official figures the defense budget represented only 1.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007 and that despite annual increases Chinese defense expenditure represents only a fraction (roughly one-sixth) of the U.S. defense budget. Though Chinese officials carefully toe the government line and deflect queries or concerns related to China’s rapidly escalating defense budget by noting figures offered up by Beijing, American observers believe the real total of defense investment is closer to $100-140 billion.

This rise in government investment towards the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as the Chinese military is formally referred to, has elicited both questions and concerns from the U.S. as well as countries situated along China’s periphery. Without any direct external threat aimed at China, skeptics wonder why there has been such a large and consistent hike in funding for increased Chinese military capabilities. Internal unrest, increased security needed for the 2008 Olympic Games, and disaster relief have each served to justify higher PLA expenses, but the push to add four new classes of indigenous submarines - along with the purchase of twelve Russian-produced Kilo-class diesel-electric attack submarines - plus other naval modernization efforts aimed at giving the PLA Navy ‘blue-water’ capabilities (i.e., the ability to operate in the deeper waters of the open ocean) have forced defense officials around the Pacific theater to reexamine their security and procurement plans.

Perhaps more worrisome to U.S. Navy officials, Chinese efforts at developing anti-ship ballistic missiles would present the U.S. Navy with a heretofore unseen threat that could strike at naval vessels operating at greater distances from China’s shores. At present that capability remains outside China’s grasp, but its intention at acquiring maneuverable, precision-strike weaponry, its development of anti-satellite weapons systems (ASATs) that could serve to disrupt vital U.S. space-based C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) networks in the event of conflict, and its legions of computer hackers (so-called ‘cyber-militia‘) have unquestionably served to raise Pentagon eyebrows.

While anxiety over the PLA’s buildup has gathered steam at the Pentagon, such concerns certainly extend both ways. China’s military modernization efforts are often attributed to the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 when Chinese missile firing exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan resulted in the dispatch of two U.S. naval carrier groups into the area. The American response was meant as a show of solidarity towards Taiwan and a message to Beijing that the U.S. would defend its regional interests. The incident exposed the weakness of Chinese military power projection in relation to that of the U.S. and has resulted in the ongoing buildup now being witnessed.

Though, as previously noted, relations between China and Taiwan are recently on the upswing, Beijing still aims to coerce Taiwan and prevent - or at least minimize - the U.S. ability to intervene on the behalf of Taipei in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. The Chinese short-term naval focus is believed to be geared towards creating an anti-access force that could deter or delay the entry of U.S. naval or air force support elements coming to relieve/reinforce Taiwanese efforts at defending its homeland.

But Taiwan is not the only focus of China. National pride and the belief that to be a great power China must have military capabilities commensurate to its economic status also underline the efforts to bolster and modernize the PLA. Thus, the long-term aspiration is to be able to project Chinese military strength well beyond its immediate borders - an achievement that would cement the nation’s status as a truly global power.

Yet despite the unyielding efforts and increased investment, China remains - for now - tied to asymmetric strategies aimed at offsetting American military superiority and saddled with defense industrial and technology capabilities that still lag behind the West. Strategic power projection is but a distant dream as the ability of the PLA to deploy forces beyond its borders for extended periods remains negligible. But China is a nation that subscribes to the long-view, which holds that while it may not currently be capable of countering U.S. power it can steadily work towards eroding American regional dominance and eventually inserting itself as the preeminent nation in the Far East. Attainment of such a goal is hardly a case of trying to square the circle - and if nothing else China is both patient and determined.

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