Piniella is a baseball lifer who was a good, but not great player and a great, if controversial, manager, who has been associated with an impressive range of baseball moments and people.  He played alongside Harvey Haddix a few years after his 12 inning perfect game loss, and Don Mattingly as he was becoming one of baseball’s top hitters.  Piniella, who later earned a reputation for being a fiery and excitable manager himself, played for Billy Martin during his first three stints as Yankee manager.  Sweet Lou made a cameo in one of the best baseball books ever written, Jim Bouton’s Ball Four, and made a game saving, of often overlooked, play in the outfield preserving a Yankee victory in one of the most famous baseball games ever played, the one game playoff between the Yankees and Red Sox in 1978.  He played for two expansion teams in the same year, including one that does not exist anymore, and two World Series winners.

Piniella was never a big star during a playing career most associated with his time as a second tier star on those great Yankee teams of the late 1970s and early 1980s, but he remained a Yankee after Catfish Hunter, Ed Figueroa, Goose Gossage, Thurman Munson, Chris Chambliss, Graig Nettles, Bucky Dent, Roy White, Mickey Rivers and Reggie Jackson were gone, even going on to manage the team between Billy Martin fourth and fifth go around as manager.

Piniella’s first years as a manager are part of the story of the underachieving dysfunctional Yankee teams of the late 1980s, but he has grown from there to become a manager of historic significance.  Currently the 14th winningest manager in history, he is only about three decent seasons short of being in the top ten.  He is one of four managers to win manager of the year in each league.  His work with the 1990 Reds stands out as a tremendous managerial accomplishment not only winning a world championship that nobody expected, but upsetting an heavily favored Oakland A’s team in the World Series.

While he has been a more high profile manager than many, Piniella has never really earned a national reputation as a manager like, for example, Tony LaRussa, Joe Torre or even Bobby Cox. Instead, throughout his playing and managing career he has been something like a form of background music to many fans, always being around, contributing something, but never becoming the main story and often easy to forget-although less easy to ignore.

I have never known baseball without Lou Piniella-first encountering him as a solid if unspectacular member of Yankee teams that were always in the playoffs, later learning that he had been Rookie of the Year for the Royals, who were the team the Yankees were always playing against in those playoffs, and still later reading about him as a hot-headed rookie in Ball Four.  By the end of his career, Piniella became something of an elder statesman on the Yankees and, along with Ron Guidry and Willie Randolph, links to happier times.  After leaving the Yankees to manage elsewhere, Piniella often seemed to pop up in October, managing some other team, and on one occasion even beating the Yankees in the playoffs.

Piniella started in the big leagues earlier and has been in the big leagues, one capacity or another, more continuously than another celebrated manager-one who has made his plans to retire after 2010 defiinte-Bobby Cox.  If Piniella also decides to retire after this year, baseball will, of course, continue, but the background music of the game won’t be the same without Sweet Lou in  a big league uniform somewhere hitting a line drive, as he did for many years, or arguing with an umpire as he has done for the last four decades.

Some of the groups that do not make the final cut include: Yankees Lou Gehrig, Bill Dickey and Lefty Gomez who played together from 1930-1939, Derek Jeter, Mariano Rivera and Jorge Posada who have played together since 1997, Mike Schmidt, Steve Carlton and Gary Maddox who were Phillie teammates from 1975-1984, Hal McRae, George Brett and Amos Otis who were together on the Royals from 1974-1983, Robin Yount, Paul Molitor and Cecil Cooper who were together from 1978-1987, Honus Wagner, Tommy Leach and Fred Clarke from 1900-1911 and Jackie Robinson, Duke Snider and Gil Hodges who played together from 1947-1956.

These were all great combinations of three players, with an interesting concentration of players from the 1970s-1980s, but none of them were quite as good as the remaining four threesomes.  They are Willie Mays, Willie McCovey and Juan Marichal (1962-1971) Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig and Earle Combs (1925-1934), Mickey Mantle, Yogi Berra and Whitey Ford, (1953-1963),  and Hank Aaron, Eddie Matthews and Warren Spahn (1954-1964).  Some of these groups are not as strong as they might seem because they do not include the prime of some of their players.  For example, both Yogi Berra and Warren Spahn had their best years before being joined by these illustrious teammates.

The three mid-century groups are easily comparable.  Each consists of one all-time great hitter, one ace pitcher and one other great hitter.  The years in question, capture most of the prime years of Hank Aaron .320/.376/..567 in 7,216 plate appearances, Willie Mays .293/.380/.545 in 5,988 plate appearances and Mickey Mantle .312/.438/.596 in 6,402 plate appearances.  Mantle was less durable and less valuable in the field and on the bases than Mays and probably Aaron as well, but the difference in offensive production, including an OPS+ that was .025 higher during the years in question, is too great to ignore giving Mantle a significant edge here, with Mays and Aaron being about even as Mays’ defense and base running is balanced out by Aaron’s greater durability.

Warren Spahn was a better pitcher than either Juan Marichal or Whitey Ford, but during the years in question, he was not the most valuable of the three.  Whitey Ford pitched 2,452.1 innings with an ERA+ of 131 striking out 1,499 and walking 894.  Spahn pitched more innings, 2896.1, but his ERA+ of 113 was significantly below that of the Yankee lefty.  Marichal’s numbers during this period were very comparable to Ford’s as he  pitched 2,805 innings with an ERA+ of 132.  Marichal struck out 1,940 walking only 531 as well so gets a slight edge over Ford primarily because he pitched more innings.

It would seem at first glance that the Yankee trio would get the edge on the remaining spot as Yogi Berra was better than either McCovey or Matthews, however, Berra’s best years were over by the late 1950s.  Berra’s 124 OPS+ would be more impressive if he had been a full time catcher for all of this time, but he averaged only 113 games a year behind the plate during these years.  While, Berra may have brought more value than Matthews who posted an OPS+ of 153 in 6,526 plate appearances during this period.  McCovey’s 164 OPS+ during the ten years with the Giants made him the most valuable of the three.

Overall, the trio of Yankees and trio of Giants are very close.  Mantle’s edge over Mays is not balanced out by Marichal’s advantage over Ford, but the McCovey Berra comparison makes changes the equation.  It is something of a judgment call, but McCovey’s offense, which was better than Mays for the ten years they were together with Marichal, gives the Giants two extremely strong hitters and a dominant pitcher. Had Berra been a full time catcher for all ten years, the Yankee threesome would have been better, but he was not, so the overall advantage, although not by much to the Giants threesome.

Ruth, Gehrig and Combs, like the Giants from the 1960s are all Hall of Famers, but Combs is one of the weakest players in Cooperstown.  This comparison can be summed up by the question of whether or not the gap between a dominant pitcher in his prime and a very good leadoff hitter is enough to outweigh the difference between Ruth and Gehrig and Mays and McCovey.  The comparsion is further complicated because the Giants played in a pitching dominated era, while the Yankees played at a time much more conducive to hitting.

Looking at neutralized stats, makes the gap between Ruth, .324/.453/.649 and Gehrig .329/.428/.615 and McCovey .300/.409/.588 and Mays .307/.397/.570 seem less extreme, but the difference is still clear and reinforced by the combined OPS+ of Ruth and Gehrig of .383 and .321 for Mays and McCovey during these years.  Mays’s superior defense and base running helps the Giants twosome, but not enough.

Combs is the weakest of these six ballplayers, weaker than almost all the players on the lists above, and probably undeserving of his plaque in Cooperstown, but between 1925-1934 he was not a reasonably valuable player.  His .399 OBP, neutralized to .384 with an OPS+ of 127, while playing pretty good centerfield made him a key player on Yankee teams that won four pennants and two World Series during this period.  Marichal was clearly a better player for the ten years in question, but for the Yankee threesome to be more valuable, Combs doesn’t have to be better than Marichal, just close enough.  He seems to meet that threshold meaning that the greatest decade long threesome was Ruth, Gehrig and Combs, but a good argument could be made for the 1962-1971 Giants as well.

It is very unusual for four players to play together for this long, but it is not unprecedented.  There are two other groups of four players who played together for ten years who are comparable to the core four.  In addition, two other groups of Yankees played together for nine years, but not ten.  From 1930-1938, Bill Dickey, Lou Gehrig, Lefty Gomez and Red Ruffing were teammates winning five pennants and five World Series.  From 1954-1962 Yogi Berra, Whitey Ford, Mickey Mantle and Moose Skowron another group of four teammates won seven pennants and four World Series  The core four played together from 1997-2003 and 2007-2009 winning six pennants and four World Series.

Two National League teams, however, have had a core group of four players together for ten years.  Henry Aaron, Del Crandall, Eddie Matthews and Warren Spahn played together for the Milwaukee Braves, from 1954-1963.  Juan Marichal, Willie Mays, Willie McCovey and Gaylord Perry played together on the San Francisco Giants from 1962-1971.

The Giants were the better of these two National League groups, but not by much.  Given that Mays’ years in question were more in the pitching dominated 1960s, his hitting numbers .293/.380/.545 OPS+ 157 were almost identical to Aaron’s .320/.375/.572 OPS+157.  Mays, however, stole more bases, got caught stealing fewer times and was a better defender, making him the better ballplayer for his ten year period.

Similarly, Eddie Matthews had an extraordinary ten year run hitting .281/.391/.534 for an OPS+ of 153 in 6,526 plate appearances.  McCovey had less playing time, only coming to bat 5,359 times but stayed within 24 homeruns of Matthews, 350-324, while hitting .283/.391/.557 for an OPS+ of 164.  The differences between the two star Giants and their two slugging Brave counterparts are quite small, almost close enough to call even.

Gaylord Perry and Juan Marichal tip the balance to the Giants.  Warren Spahn was one of the greatest pitchers ever, but most of his best years were over by 1954.  He was still a great pitcher, during this period, but not quite as dominating has he had been from 1947-1953.  Nonetheless, over the ten years in question he pitched 2722.2 innings with an ERA+ of 119.  1962-1971, however, captured most of Marichal’s prime.  During this period he posted even better numbers pitching 2,805 innings with an ERA+ of 132.  Marichal struck out 1,940 walking only 531 while Spahn struck out 1,267 and walked 669 during this period.

Comparing Del Crandall, perhaps the best NL catcher between Roy Campanella and Johnny Bench with the early years of Gaylord Perry is difficult.  Perry pitched 2,294 innings during this ten year period with an ERA+ of 119 while Crandall provided strong defense and league average hitting, a very valuable combination in a catcher.  A slight advantage might be given to the Braves here, but not enough to make up for the gap between Marichal and Spahn and the small superiority of Mays and McCovey over Matthews and Aaron.

The core four of the Yankees is quite different than the Giants foursome.  No Yankee was as good as Willie Mays, but all four were better than Gaylord Perry over the ten year period in question.  Moreover, after Derek Jeter, who has been the best of these four players, it is hard to rank the other three players. While Pettitte, for example, can be easily compared to Spahn, none of the four Braves or Giants can be compared to Mariano Rivera who spent these years being dominant at a position that did not really exist in the 1950s and 1960s.

Perhaps the best way to compare these two groups of players is to begin by comparing Derek Jeter and Willie Mays.  Both were top notch offensive players at key defensive positions.  However, Mays was a far better defender and had an OPS+ more than 30 points better than Jeter’s during the years in question, so Mays gets a big edge there.  Andy Pettitte and Juan Marichal can be compared as well since both were ace starters.  Pettite, by the standards of his time has been a real workhorse, pitching 2010.2 innings over the ten year period.  Given the context, this is almost as impressive as the 2,805 innings Marichal pitched over the ten year period.  However, Marichal was clearly the superior pitcher during these years, posting on ERA+ of 132 to Pettitte’s 112.

Mariano Rivera is hard to place in this comparison.  As a dominant closer for all ten of these seasons, Rivera was better than Perry who was a very good but not dominant starter for these years.  Neither Rivera or Posada were better than McCovey who was one of baseball’s best slugger between 1962-1971 a period in which only one player had a higher slugging percentage and only two had a higher OPS+.  A very generous analysis might conclude that Posada and Rivera were better than McCovey and Perry, but even this feels like a stretch.  The margin, however, would not make up for the advantage Mays and Marichal have over Jeter and Pettitte.

Marichal, Mays, McCovey and Perry, although probably the greatest foursome to ever play together for ten or more years, did not enjoy anything approaching the success of the Yankee core four.  The four Giants only made the post-season twice, losing the World Series in 1962 and the NLCS in 1971, while the core four was in the post-season nine out of the ten years they were together and won four World Series.  This is due somewhat to the structure of the post-season at the time, but the Yankees still won 78 more regular season games than the Giants over the years in question.

Frank Thomas’s decision to retire should not spark any real debate about his Hall of Fame chances. Thomas career numbers, dominant peak, and his mini-peak in his mid-30s all but assure his election. The only thing that could possibly derail Thomas’s chances would be some evidence that he had used steroids, but although he played most of his career in the steroid era, Thomas has never been seriously suspected of steroid use, so revelations of that kind are unlikely.

A more interesting question about Thomas’s career is how he ranks among the greatest right handed hitters ever. There are some players who were right handed hitters who were more valuable because of the positions they played and their ability to contribute defensively such as Willie Mays, Mike Schmidt and Honus Wagner, but when looking at batting numbers only, there are fewer right handed hitters who were clearly better than Thomas. Thomas is one of only eight right handed hitters to have over 9,000 plate appearances and an OPS+ of 150 or better, and one of only four with 10,000 or more plate appearances and an OPS+ of 150 or better.

These eight players are Rogers Hornsby, Jimmie Foxx, Thomas, Willie Mays, Manny Ramirez, Hank Aaron, Frank Robinson and Honus Wagner. Mays, Aaron and Robinson, like Thomas had more than 10,000 plate appearances. One more active player, Albert Pujols, only has 6,082 plate appearances so far but should be in the discussion as well.  The candidates for greatest right handed hitter ever are these nine players.

One player on this list immediately stands out as having been a better than Thomas. Like Thomas, Rogers Hornsby played in a hitter’s era. Although outhomered by Thomas 521-301, Hornsby had more hits, runs, doubles and triples and a higher batting average, on-base percentage and slugging percentage. Hornsby also had a higher OPS+ 175-156 and retains his advantage in the rate statistics when the numbers are neutralized. Hornsby is still clearly the greatest right handed hitter ever, with Albert Pujols the only potential serious challenger at this time.

Honus Wagner, while clearly a better all-around player than Thomas, and a formidable offensive player during his career still falls a little bit short of Thomas. Although he played, and dominated, in an era with less offense, Wagner’s numbers do not match up to Thomas. Even when neutralized, his OBP and slugging percentage are .024 and .086 lower than Thomas’s.

Jimmie Foxx was in many respects very comparable to Thomas.  Both were dominant players until age 29-30.  However, Foxx’s decline was faster and more severe.  Although Foxx’s career OPS+ of 163, was higher than Thomas’s, his neutralized OBP, slugging percentage and even home run totals are lower than those of Thomas, pushing him very slightly below Thomas in overall career value.

The title of second greatest right-handed hitter ever comes down to Thomas, two players, Ramirez and Pujols, with whom his career overlapped for several years and three players who were contemporaries of each other, Aaron, Mays and Robinson. Sorting out these six players is not easy. If Pujols continues to hit the way he has hit for the first decade of his career, he will clearly emerge as the best of this group, but there are no guarantees of that occurring. A comparison between Thomas and Pujols is useful in this regard. After his 29 year old season, Thomas’s numbers were .327/.452/.600 with an OPS+ of 182. Pujols, career numbers through his current age of 29 are quite similar.334/.426/.628 for an OPS+ of 172. Jimmie Foxx had similar numbers through the same point in his career hitting .334/..435/.628 for an OPS+ of 167. Foxx and Thomas did not continue to hit that well through their 30s. If Pujols falls of at a similar rate, his career numbers may not exceed those of Thomas. Interestingly Aaron, Mays and Robinson hit almost exactly as well in their 30s as they had in their 20s. Accordingly, it is simply too early to tell about Pujols.

As hitters, Aaron, Mays, Robinson, Ramirez and Thomas are very close. Aaron, Mays and Robinson’s careers overlapped from 1956-1973 and their percentages are almost indistinguishable, falling within a .011 range for batting average, with Aaron in the lead, a .015 range for on base percentage with Robinson leading and .020 range in slugging percentage with Mays leading. Thomas’s batting average and slugging percentages fit into the same range as the other three. When neutralized, all four players are within 10 points of batting average, 14 points in slugging percentage, but a considerably larger 60 point range in on base percentage as Thomas drew far more walks than the other three players.

Aaron, Mays and Robinson all played for a long time and rarely missed time due to injuries. Robinson’s 11,473 plate appearances are fewer than the other two, but are the 8^th most of any right handed hitter. Aaron had 3,826 and Mays 2,333 more plate appearances than Thomas. This is an enormous difference meaning that Aaron had roughly six, and Mays roughly four more seasons worth of hitting while posting numbers that, when adjusted for context by OPS+, 156 for Mays and 155 for Aaron, are almost identical to Thomas’s. With fewer plate appearances and adjusted on base percentages and slugging percentages that are below Thomas, Robinson is not quite in this group. Among retired players, then, Thomas is probably the fourth greatest right handed hitter ever behind Hornsby, Mays and Aaron, although the order of the last two players could be reversed, with Jimmie Foxx a very close fifth.

While it is too early to project Pujols’s career numbers with any certainty, Ramirez is in a different phase of his career. Ramirez is 37, but has yet to really enter the decline phase of his career. He currently has 637, roughly one season’s worth, fewer plate appearances than Thomas, but will likely pass Thomas in 2010 or 2011. Ramirez is already ahead of Thomas in career home runs, RBIs, hits, doubles, triples and runs,and will increase these leads over the next few years.  Ramirez has fewer career walks than Thomas and is unlikely to catch up. Ramirez OPS+ is 154 only two points behind Thomas, but is only .008 behind Thomas in on base percentage while being .036 points ahead in slugging percentage. If Ramirez ends up exceeding Thomas’s number of plate appearances by 1,000 or more without these rate numbers dropping by more than a few points, he will push Thomas to the number five spot among right handed hitters, but if Ramirez has a few ugly decline years, Thomas will remain ahead of him.

There is a tendency when looking at Thomas’s career to focus on the dropoff beginning when he was 30 years old. Through age 29, Thomas had hit .330/.462/.600 for an OPS+ of 182. This was a cut below Babe Ruth and Ted Williams at similar points in their career, about equal with Hornsby, Lou Gehrig and Ty Cobb and better than everybody else through age 29. The second half of Thomas’s career does not measure to that. Thomas also will be remembered for being a poor fielding first baseman who was primarily a designated hitter, but taken in its entirety, his offensive numbers place him among the top five right handed hitters ever.

Roughly speaking, with regards to payroll, the 30 Major League franchises can be divided into four groups.  Group I includes teams like the Pirates, Padres and Marlins who generally have total payrolls of less than $55 million and rarely compete.  Group II is something of baseball’s middle class and consists of teams with salaries in the $70-$100 million range.  This group includes teams like the Mariners, Reds or Blue Jays.  Group III includes teams with payrolls in the $100-$140 million range like the Angels, Cubs, Mets, Phillies and Red Sox.  These  are mostly reliably good teams, who can sign expensive free agents, retain their own players and are in or around the playoffs most years.  Group IV isn’t really a group because it has only one member-the Yankees.  The Yankees are in their own group because the gap between the Yankees and the rest of the teams, even those with the second or third highest payrolls is enormous.  In 2009, for example, the difference in payroll between the first and second highest payrolls, the Yankees and the Mets was about the same as that between the Mets and Diamondbacks, who had the 22nd highest payroll.

The teams in group I raise the biggest challenge to competitive balance in the Major Leagues.  It is extremely difficult to win a championship, or even sustain a good team over several years with a payroll under $60 million.  The group II teams are in a significantly better situation, but still cannot compete for the elite free agents as much as they might like and can almost never sign two highly paid free agents in a year.  They can, however, pick up a well paid veteran for a stretch drive every few years.  Groups III and IV are in the best position as they can go after free agents and retain their own stars.  However, the Yankees are in a qualitatively different position than the teams in group III.  They are able to spend, or waste, money on expensive middle relievers, and veteran backups, rarely lose a star player to free agency and can always add a player or two when needed.

This structure is not great for the game as some teams rarely contend while others more or less always do.  However, the assumption that this structure is static and cannot be changed should not go unchallenged.  The failure, for example, of the Florida Marlins to pay for a competitive team cannot be attributed to small market size alone.  Nor is it impossible that the Mariners will continue to build on this off-season and move into group III.  There are of course exceptions, the plight of small market teams such as the Royals, Pirates, Reds or A’s is serious one which will not go away easily.

The most problematic issue regarding team salaries may well be the enormous gap between the Yankees and the teams in group III.  This difference in payrolls is not, however, entirely reflective of differing abilities to pay players.  Clearly the Yankees have an ability to pay far higher salaries than the Reds or Royals, but this is less true of the Yankees relative to the Mets and Red Sox.

The difference in payroll between the Yankees and the Dodgers, Angels, Red Sox or, most particularly, the Mets, cannot be so easily explained by market size.  Nor can it be attributed to a willingness by the Yankees to lose money to put a better team on the field  The gap between the Yankees and these other teams is more the result of extremely high ticket prices at Yankee Stadium, aggressive marketing, the value of the YES network, a Yankee business model that consistently seeks to maximize profit and reinvests a fair amount of that profit back into the team and, for better or for worse, a commitment to try to win the world championship every year.  The teams in group III could all take advantage of these same strategies, or very similar ones, so that they could spend more on payroll but for the most part they do not, or they do it less effectively.

While fans of teams in group I have a legitimate and serious gripe-and one that will not be easily resolved.  Group III teams like the Red Sox and particularly the Mets, are in a very different situation.    Most fans of other teams see these teams as having high payrolls, appearing in the playoffs most years and benefiting from baseball’s payroll structure, but the Red Sox and Mets, and their fans, frequently see the salary comparison only with regards to the Yankees, not the Giants, Diamondbacks or Indians.  However, if I were a Mets fan, I might be angry at the Yankees for being the Yankees, but I also might, in moments of more serious and honest thought be angry at my team for not building a business model, given many of the same structural advantages, which would make it possible to compete with they Yankees on team payroll.

Market inefficiencies, naturally, evolve over time; and identifying new market inefficiencies can be an important ingredient for success.  This offseason there has been some talk that the new market inefficiency is defense as some teams, most notably the Red Sox seem to be more accurately measuring defense and trying to strengthen their team by adding players who are demonstrably good defensively.  Some have even suggested that older players are the new market inefficiency because many older players who can still play are not being offered contracts anywhere near what players of comparable value and age would have commanded a few years ago.  The best example of this type of player might be Johnny Damon.

One additional possible market inefficiency worth exploring is strategy.  This sounds like strange idea as strategy is something that generally becomes important once the game starts and market inefficiencies are more relevant for the construction of a team.  However, the market may currently undervalue players who can implement different strategies.

Strategy works differently in baseball than in other sports.  In many instances there is little strategy involved in the game.  On a ground ball to the shortstop, the shortstop is not faced with a strategic choice. He must field it and either throw or carry it to a base to retire a runner.  Similarly, on a fly ball to centerfield, the centerfielder is not faced with a strategic conundrum.  He simply needs to catch the ball.  Baseball players need make quick decisions, like the shortstop who may have to very quickly determine to what base to throw, but this is different than, for example, football where decisions about what plays to run are a constant feature of the game.

There is more strategy on the offensive side of baseball, but there is little evidence that any of these strategies are, with some exceptions, very useful.  Hitting and running, bunting, stealing bases and the like may lead to more strategic baseball, but it is not evident they contribute to more winning baseball.

There are at least two dimensions of baseball where new strategic approaches could help a team win and would have an impact on roster construction.  The first is in the structure of pitching staffs.  The way pitchers have been used has changed significantly over the years, so there is precedent for this.  The current system of 12, occasionally 13, pitchers on a team, seems to be very inefficient with valuable roster spots being taken up by the 5th or 6th right handed reliever rather than a decent pinch hitter, at least one left handed reliever who is not expected to do anything other than pitch to one or two batters, and fifth starters who, on many teams, have ERAs over 5.50.

The teams that can create more efficient and rational pitching staffs, and find players who can work in these structures will earn an advantage.  This is not just a matter of finding better pitchers, but of using pitchers differently.  Some ways to do this would be to switch to a four man rotation lowering pitch counts for some of the starters, replace the fifth starter with a group of relievers each of whom would be expected to pitch two or three innings, have two left-handed pitchers alternate between being the fifth starter and the loogy, use back end of the bullpen pitchers as pinch runners when needed.  These examples are meant to be illustrative, rather than specific recommendations, but they represent the kind of thinking that could give a team willing to combat the risk aversion which underpins a resistance to change throughout baseball a real advantage.  Some pitchers would obviously oppose these ideas, but if embracing ideas like these, was a way for a pitcher to stay on a major league roster, they would almost certainly go along with it.

Another strategic area where teams can begin to exploit market inefficiencies is using and acquiring players who are more versatile.  This should be done in a strategic way.  Simply acquiring players who can play a number of different positions, like the San Francisco Giants seem to be doing, in not the answer.  However, given the degree of specialization needed in baseball today, versatility can help address this issue a market efficient way.  For example, pinch runners and third catchers are valuable, but teams cannot afford to carry a player who can do little more than pinch run or catch.  However, a back end of the bullpen reliever who could pinch run, or a third catcher who could also play the corner infield positions, or hit lefties decently would have great value.  Similarly, a fifth outfielder, particularly in the AL is a luxury that some teams cannot always afford, but if that fifth outfielder could play first base, or even third base, he would be much more valuable.

Players who are more versatile make the roster seem bigger and give the manager more options.  Currently, versatility is neither encouraged nor valued very much.  A team that acquired and cultivated more versatile players would gain a small but meaningful advantage-particularly in the post-season.  Players might first balk at this, but it would also increase their value.  The aforementioned Johnny Damon, for example, would have a lot more value today if he could also play first base.  Any pitcher competing for the spot as the 5th righty out of the bullpen would have an edge on his competitors if he was able to pinch run and if his manager understood the value of using him in that capacity.

There is another issue which should be part of that discussion as well which is the question of the central definition and role of the Hall of Fame.  According to the Hall of Fame’s mission statement the Hall of Fame seeks to “Honor(ing), by enshrinement, those individuals who had exceptional careers, and recognizing others for their significant achievements.”  This sounds pretty straightforward, but there is an implicit, if at first glance insignificant, conflict between this definition and the name of the institution.  It is, after all, the Hall of Fame, not the Hall of Excellence.  This suggests that fame should also be an important consideration for considering election to the Hall of Fame.  It is this notion of fame that often makes Hall of Fame voting more complicated.  It seems pretty clear to many that, for example, Dwight Evans was a more valuable player than his longtime teammate Jim Rice, but the latter was certainly more famous which helps explain why Rice is in and Evans is out.

Another good example of this can be seen in the careers of two pitchers from a previous generation, Catfish Hunter and Bert Blyleven whose careers overlapped for all of the 1970s.  Hunter started five years earlier than Blyleven, but Blyleven continued to pitch in the big leagues thirteen years after Hunter retired.  I should disclose hear that Hunter was one of my favorite players when I was young, so I am not entirely objective .  Nonetheless, by almost any measure, Blyleven was the better pitcher.  He had 63 more wins and1,489 more strikeouts than Hunter.  Hunter, however, had a winning percentage that was 0.40 higher and an ERA that was 0.05 lower.

A closer look at the numbers shows that Blyleven was clearly better.  Blyleven had a better ERA+ , 118 to 114, averaged 1.5 more strikeouts and 0.1 fewer walks per nine innings, and did this while pitching 1520.2 more innings.  Hunter’s neutralized career numbers are 174-179 with a 4.11 ERA while Blyleven’s are 285-237 with a 3.71 ERA.  Hunter enjoyed a great peak going 111-49 with a 2.69 ERA and 816 strikeouts from 1971-1975.  Blyleven’s five year peak from 1973-1977 was at least just as good as he had a 2.75 ERA with 1141 strikeouts, although his 79-72 record with far weaker teams was not as good.  If the peak is expanded to six or more years, Blyleven’s numbers look even better compared to Hunters.

Hunter, of course received strong support for the Hall of Fame and was elected in his third year of eligibility, while Blyleven remains on the outside.  Hunter may not have been the better pitcher, but he was luckier, primarily because he spent his best years pitching for very good teams, which contributed to him being was more famous.  Hunter’s fame numbers are much stronger than Blyleven’s.  Hunter appeared in eight All-Star Games to Blyleven’s two.  Finished in the top five in Cy Young voting four times and won once.  Blyleven had three top five Cy Young finishes, but never won a Cy Young awards.  Some would argue that this means that Hunter was the better pitcher, but it also means that Hunter was viewed as the better pitcher-in other words that he was more famous.  Blyleven spent his best years toiling for teams that did not make the post-season while Hunter was a post-season fixture with both the A’s and Yankees from 1971-1978.  What All Star manager would not, in those circumstances have given Hunter a spot on the team over Blyleven if they were having comparable seasons.

Hunter was the ace of a great and colorful team that won three straight World Series from 1972-1974 and pitched for yet another team, the 1976-1978 Yankees, that won three straight pennants.  He helped pitch his team to victory against Tom Seaver in two World Series games including throwing seven shutout innings in a game where his team was facing Seaver in an elimination game.  Blyleven was also an excellent post-season pitcher, who was an important part of two World Series teams, but not as high profile as Hunter.  Hunter had a fantastic, if entirely made-up, baseball nickname, Blyleven had a slightly off-beat foreign name.  Bob Dylan wrote a song about Hunter; Chris Berman made up a funny nickname for Blyleven.  Clearly, one of these pitchers had a degree of fame that the other did not.

The point is not the Hunter’s fame means that he deserves to be in while Blyleven should be out .  In my view, they both should be in.  However, this outcome suggests that for at least some voters fame is an important, if somewhat subjective, criteria which can explain some voting outcomes.  Hunter, Rice and a few others have clearly benefitted from their relative fame.  This does not, however, explain every outcome.  Don Mattingly was a very famous player for a number of years, but the reality of his playing career seems to have trumped this in the voters’ minds.  Fame does not explain Tim Raines’ lack of support either.  Raines not only put up great numbers, but was truly famous for most of the 1980s.  Blyleven’s case is different.  His lack of fame clearly works against his Hall of Fame chances.  If his numbers were borderline, it would be a legitimate reason for keeping him out.  However, his numbers are not really borderline, they are excellent and support his election to the Hall of Fame.

]]> http://thefastertimes.com/baseballbythenumbers/2010/01/27/fame-and-the-hall-of-fame/feed/ http://thefastertimes.com/baseballbythenumbers/2010/01/18/the-paradox-of-historically-great-pitchers-in-a-hitters-era/ http://thefastertimes.com/baseballbythenumbers/2010/01/18/the-paradox-of-historically-great-pitchers-in-a-hitters-era/#comments Mon, 18 Jan 2010 19:29:26 +0000 Lincoln Mitchell http://thefastertimes.com/baseballbythenumbers/?p=444 The last fifteen years have, for a number of reasons been record setting years for offense as career and single season home run records have fallen.  Numbers such as 30 home runs or 100 RBIs, which used to be the measure of a very good season, have become less meaningful; ERAs have ballooned; and middle infielders, who used to be in the lineup largely for their defense, are now expected to produce at the plate as well.  Other basic numbers provide further evidence of increased offense.  In the NL, the lowest ERA of the last 15 years was 4.11 in 1996.  Every years from 1954-1993, the league ERA was lower than that.  Similarly in the AL, the 4.36 ERA in 2008 and 2005 was the lowest of the last fifteen years, but higher than every year since 1950 except for 1987.

While the last fifteen years have not been a great period for pitching in general, it has been a surprisingly good period for a small handful of individual pitchers.  The quartet of Roger Clemens, Randy Johnson, Greg Maddux and Pedro Martinez, was able to post extraordinary numbers during this period despite the increase in offense.  Several other pitchers such as Zack Greinke in 2009, Mark Prior in 2003 and Kevin Brown in 1996 had one or more great seasons in this period as well.

In general, the last fifteen years, while tough for pitchers in general, has been something of a golden age for great pitching.  Since 190, 108 pitches have posted an ERA+ of 175 or better in a season in which they pitched enough innings to qualify for the ERA title.  While ERA+ is far from perfect measure of pitching dominance, it nicely and parsimoniously makes it possible to see a pitcher’s season in the context of the entire league.  The 175 threshold, while somewhat arbitrary, is a good cutoff because it yield a number of pitchers, that is not too small for meaningful analysis, while not too inclusive.  Of those 108 pitcher seasons, 26 have occurred since the resolution of the 1994 strike.

Almost a quarter of all of these dominant seasons occurred in the last fifteen years.  This number is a little bit misleading because due to the switch to the five man pitching rotation and the current number of teams, there are now 150 spots in major league pitching rotations today, whereas there were only 64 (16 teams times four starters) for the first six decades of the last century.

Taking the switch to the five man rotation, which for the purpose of  this calculation was dated, not entirely accurately to 1977, as well as the various waves of expansion, there have been 9,790 possible full time starting pitcher seasons since 1901 of which 2,250, or 22.9%, have occurred in the period from 1995-2009.  In this context the 26 historic pitcher seasons, or 24% of the overall total, do not look as significant, suggesting there has not been a spate of dominant pitching seasons in the last fifteen years.

Most of the dominant pitching seasons of the 20th century, however, came during the deadball era as fully 34 of these 108 seasons came between 1901-1919.  If we eliminate the deadball period from the sample and only include the years from 1920 to the present, the last fifteen years look somewhat different.  During this period, 35% of the dominant pitching seasons have occurred since 1995, but these years only constituted 26% of the overall pitching seasons.

There are several possible explanations for this seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon.  The first is methodological, as the league’s ERA increases, as it did during the last fifteen years, it is easier for pitchers to post ERAs that are significantly better than the league ERA.  If the league ERA is 3.77, like it was in the AL 1958, it is a lot more difficult to be 75% better, even for the best pitchers, than when the league ERA is around 4.50 as it has been in the AL in most recent years.

This is, however, only a partial explanation, which is not entirely sufficient.  It is possible that the emergence of Clemens, Johnson, Maddux and Martinez at around the same time is just something of a coincidence, a random event that has had a major impact on the game’s history, but there are other explanations as well  One of the most significant is that better training, medical breakthroughs and, in the case of Clemens and perhaps others, steroids, allows great pitchers to keep pitching.  Seventeen out of the forty seven seasons on the list in which the pitcher was over 30, six of the 14 seasons on the list in which the pitcher was over 35, and two of the three seasons in which the pitcher was over forty, have occurred since 1995.

Regardless of the reason, pitching seasons have not, in recent years continued the trend of regressing to the mean.,which they did for most of the middle of half of the period from 1920-1993.  In fact, the reverse has occurred.  Baseball fans have reaped the benefit of this because even during this period when the game’s balance has tipped to offense, we have been able to still see some fantastic pitchers.  It is not clear whether or not this will continue, but Zack Greinke and Tim Lincecum, the two reigning Cy Young Award winners, whose ERA+ both exceeded 175 in 2009, are among those pitchers poised to continue this phenomenon into the next decade.

Sometimes players who would be expected to be borderline candidates get elected, such as Dawson this year or Jim Rice last year, but sometimes similar candidates get little consideration at all.  One example of this type of player is Will Clark who got less than 5% of the vote the first time he appeared on a Hall of Fame ballot and was dropped from future ballots.  Will Clark’s story is well known.  He had a few great years with the Giants before moving to the AL where his career took a downturn, but had one last great run in 2000, the last season of his career as a late season pickup by the Cardinals where he filled in for the injured Mark McGwire down the stretch run.

Giants fans will also remember Clark as the player who returned a once proud franchise to respectability after about a decade of what might be called the Johnnie LeMaster years.  The team won two divisions in Clark’s first five years after not making the post-season since 1971.  In 1989, Clark’s single against Mitch Williams in game five of the NLCS might still be the biggest hit in the franchise’s San Francisco history, and gave the team its first pennant in 27 years.  During Clark’s peak, from 1987-1992, he it .303/.378/.515 with an OPS+ of 152.  Andrew Dawson and Jim Rice, by comparison only had an OPS+ above 150 in one and two seasons respectively.

The narrative of Clark’s career is true, but only to a degree.  It is consistent with the image fans had of Clark over the course of his career, but the numbers are a little more nuanced.  The worst years in Clark’s career were 1995-1999.  During that time he hit .304/.388/.481 for an OPS+ of 121 with an average of fifteen home runs a year.  These were not great numbers for the offense heavy late 90s, but they are not terrible particularly given this was the worst period of Clark’s career.

Clark’s career pattern does not look all that different from recent Hall of Fame inductee Jim Rice who also retired at age 36 and who was a less productive player between the ages of 31-35, although Rice did not bounce back at age 36.  Rice’s numbers for that five year period were .288/.349/.447.  with an OPS+ of 116.  Rice averaged six more home runs a year, but also grounded into 18 more double plays a year and was a considerably less valuable defensive player at that point in his career.

The last year of Clark’s career, 2000, looks different in this context.  It was not the only good year after a series of bad years, but rather an improvement on the already reasonably strong 1997-9 campaigns.  Clark’s .319/.418/.546 2000 season stands out in a number of ways.  First, it is only one of 61 seasons where a player 35 or older hit .300/.400/.500 or better in 450 or more plate appearances.  Clark was 36 and came to the plate 507 times that season.  It was also the 51st highest OPS+ for a player 36 or older with 450 or more plate appearances.  In this context Clark’s 2000 season is clearly a standout, but far from historically excellent, year for a player his age.

Clark’s 2000 season is more noteworthy because he decided to retire immediately following that season.  Few players have retired after such a good season without some kind of extenuating circumstance.  Clark’s 144 OPS+ is the second highest ever for a player’s last season in which that player had .450 or more plate appearances.  The highest belongs to Barry Bonds who was retired, or blacklisted, after 2007 due to concerns about steroids and other issues.  The only other player to have an OPS+ of 140 or better in his last season was Mickey Mantle who was a victim of injuries and not understanding how the new context affected his offensive production.  The only other player to ever top .300/.400/.500 in his last season while coming to the plate 450 or more times was Joe Jackson who was, of course, banned from baseball for life after 1920 while still one of the best ballplayers in the world.

For those interested in more old fashioned statistics, Clark is one of only four players to retire after hitting over .300 with more than 20 home runs in his last season.  Two of the others, Dave Nilsson and Kirby Puckett, retired suddenly due to personal reasons and injury respectively.  The third was Ted Williams who was, well, Ted Williams.

Clark, although almost certainly a better player than Rice or Dawson was, probably does not belong in the Hall of Fame, even if the narrative of his career has not been a fair one.  However, Clark’s decision to retire after 2000 while still a valuable player probably affected his Hall of Fame chances.  Had Clark played two to four more years he would have ended up in the low 300s, instead of 284, for career home runs and somewhere between 2,500-3,000 for career hits, instead of 2,176.  These numbers may have been strong enough to get him into the Hall of Fame as all but two eligible players, Dave Parker and Harold Baines, who met these milestones are in the Hall of Fame, but they would certainly not have made him an automatic selection because the timing of Clark’s career, which peaked right before the steroid era, would make these numbers look less impressive.

Clark, of course, does not get consideration for what might have been if he had played a few more years, but it remains striking that Clark did not make it to a second ballot while comparable players like Rice and Dawson are enshrined in Cooperstown.

In some respects the last ten years were more competitive than many fans might think.  During the recently completed decade, seven NL and six AL, fully 13 out of 30 teams, appeared in the World Series.  In the 1970s, by contrast, four NL and four AL, or eight out of 26 teams appeared in the World Series.  The 1980s, a decade generally understood to be the last highly competitive decade saw seven AL and six NL teams appear in the World Series.  In this regard, the 2000s were as competitive as any recent decade.  This is, however, a somewhat narrow way to gauge the extent to which baseball is dominated by a few teams and does not address the more serious concerns of many fans and observers.

The two most common laments in this vein are that few teams are even contenders in any given year, and that some teams have not won a championship in years.  The first lament is not so much wrong as over-simplified.  The expanded playoff system means that many teams are in contention for a playoff spot well into the August or September.  In most years more than half the teams finish within five games of a playoff spot.  For example, last year, 11 teams either won a playoff spot of finished within five games of one.  In 2008, the corresponding number was 12.

The real problem is not that most teams have little chance of making the playoffs, but that so many teams are chasing so few playoff spots, or more precisely that while most teams may have a good shot at vying for a playoff spot, some teams, such as the Yankees, Red Sox or Dodgers seemed all but guaranteed a playoff spot most years before the season even starts.

The second concern is more empirically accurate.  Teams like the Pirates have not won a World Series since, 1979 or even appeared in the playoffs since 1992 and have little chance of getting back any time soon.  The Royals who have not won a World Series, or even appeared in the playoffs since 1985, face a similar plight in the AL.  Other teams, like the Giants have had even longer droughts after coming agonizingly close to the championships in 1962 and 2002.

This situation, however, has been part of baseball for a long time as for most of the sport’s history there were teams that remained out of contention for decades.  For example, the St. Louis Browns won exactly one pennant between during the 20th Century before they moved to Baltimore to become the Orioles in 1954.  The Athletics were relatively moribund for the middle of the 20th Century failing to win a pennant between 1931 and 1972.  The Senators/Twins franchise, the Phillies and others experienced similar periods of a quarter of a century or more without winning anything.

Because there are now 30 teams in the Major Leagues, this problem will only get worse.  If championships were evenly distributed, each team would win one every 30 years, which means a typical fan could expect to see their team win the World Series twice, or perhaps three times in their lifetimes.  This might sound like a good arrangement for a Cubs or Giants fan, but perhaps less so for a Yankee, Red Sox or Cardinal fans.

While resolving this situation will not be easy, and most proposed solutions are laden with foreseeably precarious consequences, being a baseball fan may begin, or perhaps has already begun, to change.  Many people may start to root for their local team-even if they are rarely in the post-season while choosing a favorite, perhaps from the other league, from among the more dominant teams.  Thus Pirates fans, might think of the Red Sox, Yankees or somebody else as their second team while Royals fans might view the Mets, Phillies or Dodgers as their fallback playoff team.  Rooting for a baseball team might become like rooting for the World Cup where many people have one favorite team-which sometimes doesn’t even make the tournament and one preferred team from among the ranks of the strong contenders.  For example, I would love to see Georgia or Mexico win the World Cup, but will probably root for Brazil in the mean time once the tournament gets down to eight or so teams.

This sounds somehow blasphemous to the fan who has rooted his or her whole life for one team, but with thirty teams, little chance of that number declining and the movement of MLB into a two tiered system with some teams only occasionally being part of the first tier, it is probably the most practical and natural solution.